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INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to overstate the Model Penal Code’s importance for
American criminal law. Since its publication by the American Law
Institute in 1962,1 the Model Penal Code (“MPC” or “the Code”) has had
an outsized impact on legislatures, courts, and legal scholarship.2 Indeed,
more than thirty states have enacted criminal codes influenced by the
MPC.3 American courts have cited the Code and its commentary as
persuasive authority thousands of times, and commentators have
likewise spilled much ink discussing the MPC’s meaning and
significance.4 For good reason, George Fletcher once described the Code
as “the central document of American criminal justice.”5
1. MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326–28 (2007).
3. The MPC’s official commentary identifies thirty-four criminal codes influenced at
least in part by the Code. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I: GEN. PROVISIONS xi
(AM. L. INST. 1985). That list includes Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. The number of states influenced by the Code
may be lower or higher, depending on how one counts. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting
Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1318 n.38 (2011) (“The MPC nose counting is
complicated by the extent to which some states have adopted it with changes. Depending
on the extent of those changes, some states are counted by some commentators as having
adopted the MPC in whole, in part, or only being ‘influenced’ by it.”) (citing Paul H.
Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 692 n.45 (1983)).
4. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 2, at 327–28. As of April 2022, the phrase
“Model Penal Code” appeared in more than 5,600 state cases and more than 2,600 federal
cases. See Results for:“Model Penal Code,” LEXISNEXIS (last visited Feb. 27, 2022, 1:35 PM),
https://plus.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1530671&crid=71c29cac-a3b3-440d-88980f4e7ecf0654&pdsearchterms=%22Model+Penal+Code%22&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclic
k&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdstartin=&pdpsf=&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&e
comp=s8ttk&earg=pdsf&prid=a2e586e0-d526-42fc-bb4a-4189434f2c37. The same phrase
appeared in more than 10,000 secondary sources, including over 6,900 law reviews and
journals. Id. Of course, countless other authorities discuss statutory provisions influenced
by the MPC without mentioning the Code itself. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 2, at
327–28.
5. George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. C RIM. L. REV. 3, 3
(1998). Similar statements abound in the literature. For example, Sanford Kadish once
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The Code has influenced American criminal law most significantly
through its culpability provisions.6 The Code’s central culpability
provision, section 2.02, establishes four culpability levels to be used in
defining criminal offenses: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence.7 Importantly, section 2.02(1) generally requires culpability
for “each material element of the offense.”8 As a result, the Code generally
demands, at a minimum, that criminal offenses impose culpability
requirements that correspond to their objective elements. Additionally,
the MPC often requires that a defendant act with a particular purpose,
such as taking another’s property “with purpose to deprive him thereof”
in order to commit theft.9 If an offense imposes such a “specific” or
“ulterior” intent requirement, culpability is still required for each
objective element.10

observed that the Code was so influential that “it . . . permeated and transformed the
substantive criminal law of this country.” Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s
Historical Antecedents, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 538 (1988).
6. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF.
L. REV. 943, 952 (1999) (“The Code’s mens rea proposals dissipated . . . clouds of confusion
with an astute and perspicuous analysis that has been adopted in many states and has
infused thinking about mens rea everywhere.”); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 681, 691 (1983) (“Section 2.02 . . . is perhaps ‘the single most important provision of
the Code’ and the most significant and enduring achievement of the Code’s authors.”)
(quoting Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 601
(1963)); David Wolitz, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Process, and the Jurisprudential Roots of the
Model Penal Code, 51 TULSA L.J. 633, 669 (2016) (“The most celebrated and perhaps
most influential feature of the Model Penal Code has been its articulation of the
traditional mens rea requirement of criminal law and the hierarchy of culpable mental
states it delineated: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.”).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). Some
states use the same levels with slightly different terminology. The most common alteration
is to replace “purpose” with “intent.” Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal
Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities,
Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 238 (1997) (finding
that, as of 1997, approximately three-quarters of MPC states used “intentionally” in place
of “purposely”).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
9. Id. § 223.2(1) (theft by unlawful taking or disposition); see also id. § 211.3
(terroristic threats); id. § 213.5 (indecent exposure); id. § 221.1(1) (burglary); id. § 224.1(1)
(forgery); id. § 224.2 (simulating objects of antiquity or rarity, etc.); id. § 224.9(1) (rigging
publicly exhibited contest); id. § 224.10 (defrauding secured creditors); id. § 223.5 (theft of
property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake); id. § 240.2(1) (threats and other improper
influence in official and political matters); id. § 241.3 (unsworn falsification to authorities);
id. § 241.5(1) (false reports to law enforcement authorities); id. § 241.7 (tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence); id. § 241.9 (impersonating a public servant); id. § 242.2
(resisting arrest or other law enforcement); id. § 242.3 (hindering apprehension or
prosecution); id. § 250.1(1) (riot); id. § 250.2(1) (disorderly conduct); id. § 250.8 (disrupting
meetings and processions); id. § 250.12(1)(a) (unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance).
10. PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 61(a)(2) (1984).
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The MPC’s stated-culpability provision, section 2.02(4), plays a
critical role in enforcing the Code’s requirement of culpability for each
offense element.11 Section 2.02(4) applies “[w]hen the law defining an
offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material
elements thereof.”12 If a statute prescribes a culpability requirement
without distinguishing between multiple elements, the culpability
requirement “shall apply to all the material elements of the offense,
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”13 For example, suppose that
a criminal code defines arson to occur when a person “knowingly damages
a building of another by starting a fire or using an explosive.” Section
2.02(4) would apply because the offense definition prescribes a culpability
requirement of knowledge without distinguishing between the objective
elements of the offense. Applying section 2.02(4), arson would thus
require an actor to (1) knowingly damage a building (2) that he or she
knows belongs “to another” by (3) knowingly starting a fire or knowingly
using an explosive. Therefore, a person would not commit arson by
damaging a building the actor believes to be his or her own, or by
damaging a building by starting a fire unwittingly.14
Numerous offenses in the MPC implicate section 2.02(4) because they
prescribe culpability requirements without distinguishing between
multiple offense elements.15 More importantly, however, section 2.02(4)
has implications for countless real-world criminal offenses. As will be
discussed later in this Article, a majority of MPC jurisdictions have
enacted stated-culpability provisions influenced by the Code.16 As a
practical matter, a provision like section 2.02(4) stands to affect far more
offenses in a given state criminal code than in the MPC itself. After all,
state criminal codes have ballooned in the six decades since the MPC’s
publication,17 and state criminal codes, like the MPC, routinely prescribe
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. § 2.02(2)(b) (defining “knowingly”).
15. See, e.g., id. § 210.1(1) (criminal homicide); id. § 210.5 (causing or aiding suicide);
id. § 211.1(1) (simple assault); id. § 211.1(2)(b) (aggravated assault); id. § 211.2 (recklessly
endangering another person); id. § 212.2 (felonious restraint); id. § 212.3 (false
imprisonment); id. § 212.4 (interference with custody); id. § 220.1(1) (arson); id. § 220.2(1)
(causing catastrophe); id. § 220.3(1) (criminal mischief); id. § 230.4 (endangering welfare of
children); id. § 241.4 (false alarms to agencies of public safety); id. § 241.5(1) (falsely
incriminating another); id. § 241.8(1) (tampering with public records or information); id. §
242.1 (obstructing administration of law or other governmental function); id. § 242.2
(resisting arrest or other law enforcement).
16. See infra notes 159–66, 173–74 and accompanying text.
17. Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 768 (2004) (“The
single most visible development in the substantive criminal law is that the sheer number
of criminal offenses has grown exponentially.”).
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culpability requirements for offenses without distinguishing between
objective elements.18 Section 2.02(4), then, has significant ramifications
for hundreds if not thousands of criminal offenses in MPC jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, section 2.02(4) is deeply flawed. Section 2.02(4) itself
is unclear about when and how it applies, and the MPC’s commentary
reveals the drafters’ own confusion about the provision’s role in the
Code’s culpability scheme. Predictably, state courts have struggled with
applying stated-culpability provisions, often exploiting their weaknesses
to justify the imposition of strict liability.19 As a result, many states
circumvent the Code’s general rule that culpability is required for “each
material element of [an] offense.”20
This Article comprehensively reviews the law of stated culpability
requirements in MPC jurisdictions. Part I provides an overview of section
2.02(4), explaining how the provision works and its role in the MPC’s
culpability scheme. Part II then identifies section 2.02(4)’s main
weaknesses, drawing on both the provision itself and the Code’s
commentary. Next, Part III reviews the law in the twenty-five states with
culpability provisions influenced by the MPC, identifying specific
problems that section 2.02(4) has created in the case law. Finally, Part
IV recommends new stated-culpability rules that improve section 2.02(4)
and more rigorously enforce the Code’s requirement of culpability for
each offense element.
I. THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S STATED-CULPABILITY PROVISION
The MPC prohibits imposing strict liability for serious criminal
offenses.21 Section 2.02(1) generally demands that a defendant act
“purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense.”22 The Code
recognizes only section 2.05 as an exception to the general rule that
culpability is required for each offense element.23 Section 2.05 permits
such strict or “absolute” liability only for (1) offenses that are mere civil

18. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(2) (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:2(I) (2021); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-2(c)(1) (2021) (all using the Model Penal Code’s
language about prescribing a culpability requirement “without distinguishing”).
19. Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to
1999: A “Model” Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 408 (2001) (“Many of these outcomes
were very disturbing because state supreme courts were . . . holding that at least one
objective element . . . was a strict-liability element.”).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
21. See id. § 2.05.
22. Id. § 2.02(1).
23. Id. § 2.05.
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violations24 and (2) criminal offenses outside the criminal code for which
“a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability . . . plainly appears.”25
Even when a legislature intends to impose absolute liability for an
existing offense outside of the criminal code, section 2.05 automatically
reduces the offense’s grade to a civil violation.26
Section 2.02(4) helps enforce the Code’s requirement of culpability for
each offense element. The provision applies “[w]hen the law defining an
offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material
elements thereof.”27 Hence, the provision anticipates that an offense
definition may explicitly state a single culpability requirement, followed
by consecutive objective elements. For such an offense, section 2.02(4)
clarifies that the culpability requirement “shall apply to all the material
elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”28
The Code’s official commentary explains section 2.02(4)’s role in the
Code’s culpability scheme. The commentary emphasizes that culpability
requirements “must be addressed . . . with respect to each material
element” of the crime, and that requires consulting both the offense
definition and section 2.02.29 In particular, section 2.02(4) was designed
to resolve ambiguity about whether a stated culpability requirement
“applies to all the elements of the offense or only to the element that it
immediately introduces.”30 For such a statute, the Code assumes that the
culpability requirement “was meant to apply to all material elements.”31
If the legislature intends a different result, the commentary notes,
“proper drafting ought to make it clear.”32 The commentary provides an
example involving false imprisonment, an offense that occurs when one
“knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially
24. See id. § 2.05(1)(a). Elsewhere, the MPC explicitly states that violations are not
criminal offenses. See id. § 1.04(5) (“An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute
of this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this Code or in the law defining
the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is
authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now
provides that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a crime
and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based
on conviction of a criminal offense.”).
25. See id. § 2.05(1)(b).
26. Id. § 2.05(2)(a) (“[W]hen absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material
element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based
upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation . . . .”).
27. Id. § 2.02(4).
28. Id.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 1 at 229–30 (AM. L. INST.
1985).
30. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245.
31. Id.
32. Id.

2022]

STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1219

with his liberty.”33 According to the commentary, section 2.02(4) would
require that the actor both know that he or she is restraining the victim
and know “the unlawful character of the restraint.”34
Importantly, the MPC’s default culpability provision, section 2.02(3),
provides a backstop preventing the imposition of absolute liability.
Section 2.02(3) applies “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a
material element of an offense is not prescribed by law.”35 In doing so,
the provision seems designed to cover objective elements not covered by
section 2.02(4).36 After all, section 2.02(4) applies when a statute
“prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
an offense,”37 while section 2.02(3) applies when a culpability
requirement “is not prescribed by law.”38 When an offense fails to
prescribe a culpability requirement for a given element, the element is
satisfied “if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect
thereto.”39 Significantly, the Code’s culpability requirements are
hierarchical, such that proof of a more culpable mental state will satisfy
a requirement of a less serious one.40 Hence, as a practical matter, section
2.02(3) is intended to require recklessness for any offense element that
lacks a stated culpability level under section 2.02(4).41
Together, then, sections 2.02(3) and (4) are designed to ensure that
culpability is required for each objective element of an offense. Using
burglary as an example, the commentary shows how the provisions are
meant to work together to prevent absolute liability.42 Under the Code, a
person commits burglary if he or she “enters a building . . . with purpose
to commit a crime therein,”43 and a separate provision aggravates the
offense if it is committed “in the dwelling of another at night.”44 The
commentary clarifies that the actor must have a purpose to commit a
crime at the time of entry, but purpose is not required as to entering “the
dwelling of another at night.”45 Instead, “[s]ection 2.02(3) should control

33. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3).
34. Id. at 245–46. This portion of the commentary fails to clarify whether knowledge is
also necessary to satisfy the requirement of restraining the victim “so as to interfere
substantially with his liberty.” Id. This Article discusses that aspect of the offense in Section
II.B.2. See infra Section II.B.2.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3).
36. See id. § 2.02(4).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 2.02(3).
39. Id.
40. See id. § 2.02(5).
41. See id. §2.02(3).
42. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 246 (A M. L. INST. 1985).
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1).
44. Id. § 221.1(2).
45. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 246.
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elements of this character, and therefore recklessness should suffice in
the absence of special provision to the contrary.”46
Section 2.02(1) generally requires culpability for each objective
element, and that requirement is limited only by extremely narrow
exceptions set out in section 2.05.47 Importantly, sections 2.02(3) and (4)
are not intended to justify the imposition of absolute liability.48 Instead,
they are designed to prevent it.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S APPROACH
Despite playing a critical role in the Code’s culpability scheme,
section 2.02(4) is a deeply flawed provision. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to square some of section 2.02(4)’s language with its purpose, and the
Code’s own commentary is inconsistent about its proper application.49
This Part discusses three shortcomings of section 2.02(4). First, section
2.02(4) appears to exclude culpability requirements for grading
provisions by limiting its application to “the law defining [the] offense.”50
Second, section 2.02(4) is too broad in applying a stated culpability
requirement to “all the material elements of the offense.”51 Third, section
2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception is unnecessary and ill conceived.
A. Excluding Culpability Requirements for Grading Provisions
By its terms, section 2.02(4) appears to exclude culpability
requirements that might apply to grading provisions. For reasons that
are unclear, the provision applies only when “the law defining an offense”
states a culpability requirement without distinguishing between
objective elements.52 The drafters’ choice of language is confusing, in
part, because the Code’s default culpability provision, section 2.02(3),
does not directly limit itself to objective elements that appear in offense
definitions.53 The two provisions also appear back to back, suggesting at

46. Id.
47. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05.
48. See id. §§ 2.02(3), 2.02(4).
49. Compare id. § 2.02(4), with MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt.
1 at 231−32.
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. § 2.02(3) (“When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of
an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”).
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first blush that the Code imposes a narrower rule for stated culpability
requirements than it does for default culpability requirements.54
Even more problematically, the MPC itself frequently distinguishes
offense definitions from grading provisions. Indeed, when the MPC uses
separate provisions to define and grade a criminal offense, as it often
does, the Code uses subsection titles to differentiate them. For such
offenses, grading provisions always use the word “grading,” while offense
definitions always say either “definition” or “defined.”55 Hence, section
2.02(4) strongly implies that it is limited to offense definitions in applying
only to “the law defining an offense.”56
The Code’s drafters may have limited section 2.02(4)’s scope because
another culpability provision, section 2.02(10), addresses culpability
requirements stated in grading provisions.57 Section 2.02(10) applies
“[w]hen the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense
is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently.”58 In such
a case, the “grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the
determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any
material element of the offense.”59 For example, as the Code’s
commentary explains, an actor does not commit an offense purposely or
knowingly if the actor was merely reckless or negligent as to at least one
offense element.60 Section 2.02(10) would instead classify the offense as
being committed recklessly or negligently, even if the actor was
purposeful as to another offense element.61 In other words, the provision
identifies “the lowest common denominator” in terms of the actor’s
culpability and grades the offense accordingly.62
Significantly, however, section 2.02(10) fails to address how
culpability requirements apply to new offense elements that appear in
54. See id. § 2.02. As I have discussed elsewhere, however, the Code indirectly limits
section 2.02(3) to offense definitions in applying only to “material elements of an offense.”
See Scott England, Default Culpability Requirements: The Model Penal Code and Beyond,
99 OR. L. REV. 43, 56 (1999). The problem arises because the Code “defines ‘element’ to
mean conduct, circumstances, or results that are ‘included . . . in the definition of the
offense.’” Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)).
55. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (criminal coercion); id. § 213.3 (corruption of
minors and seduction); id. § 220.3 (criminal mischief); id. § 221.1 (burglary); id. § 222.1
(robbery); id. § 224.1 (forgery); id. § 240.2 (threats and other improper influence in official
and political matters); id. § 241.8 (tampering with public records or information); id. § 242.6
(escape); id. § 250.2 (disorderly conduct); id. § 251.2 (prostitution and related offenses).
56. Id. § 2.02(4).
57. Id. § 2.02(10).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 12 at 252 (AM. L. INST.
1985).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 251–52.
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grading provisions.63 Although the Code grades some offenses according
to whether they are “committed” with specified states of mind,64 the MPC
much more commonly uses grading provisions to impose new objective
elements beyond those required by offense definitions.65 Moreover,
several grading provisions state culpability requirements for multiple
new offense elements, thus directly implicating section 2.02(4). For
example, burglary is graded as a more serious offense if the actor
“purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily
injury on anyone.”66 Similarly, the Code aggravates the offense of
criminal mischief when “the actor purposely causes pecuniary loss in
excess of $5,000, or a substantial interruption or impairment of public
communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other
public service.”67 Both grading provisions prescribe culpability levels
without distinguishing between objective elements of the offense, thus
raising the question of whether they apply to all aggravating elements or
just the ones that immediately follow. Section 2.02(4) does not appear to
apply to either provision, however, because the Code limits section
2.02(4)’s application to culpability requirements that appear in offense
definitions.68
Despite section 2.02(4)’s language, the Code’s commentary reveals
that the drafters intended for section 2.02 to apply to grading provisions.
The commentary’s two clearest examples involve the MPC’s default
culpability provision, section 2.02(3), which requires, at a minimum,
recklessness for any offense element that lacks a stated culpability level
under section 2.02(4).69 The first example involves theft, which the Code
grades according to the stolen property’s value without stating any
culpability requirements.70 The commentary explicitly states that section
2.02(3) requires at least recklessness as to the property’s value.71
63. See id. at 252 (“Subsection (10) . . . does not apply to . . . offenses graded on a
different basis . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (murder); id. § 210.3(1)(a)
(manslaughter); id. § 210.4(1) (negligent homicide).
65. See, e.g., id. § 220.3(2) (criminal mischief); id. § 221.1(2) (burglary); id. § 222.1(2)
(robbery); id. § 224.1(2) (forgery); id. § 240.2(2) (threats and other improper influence in
official and political matters); id. § 241.8(2) (tampering with public records or information);
id. § 242.6(4) (escape); id. § 250.2(2) (disorderly conduct); id. § 251.2(3) (promoting
prostitution).
66. Id. § 221.1(2)(a).
67. Id. § 220.3(2).
68. See id. § 2.02(4).
69. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2).
71. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 223.1 cmt. 3 at 144 (AM. L. INST.
1980) (“Since valuation is related to ‘the harm or evil . . . sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense,’ the dollar amounts that are specified in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b)
are ‘material elements of the offense’ as that term is defined in Section 1.13(9) and (10).

2022]

STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1223

Likewise, the MPC aggravates the offense of burglary when it is
committed “in the dwelling of another at night.”72 Again, the commentary
explicitly states that recklessness is required for those elements because
they are material elements of the offense.73
To say the least, it would be highly illogical for the Code to apply
section 2.02(3) to grading provisions but fail to do so for section 2.02(4).
After all, section 2.02(3) provides a backstop to section 2.02(4), allowing
courts to impose culpability requirements only if they are not prescribed
by law.74 As a result, a court cannot apply section 2.02(3) to a grading
provision until it first identifies the provision’s prescribed culpability
requirements under section 2.02(4). Moreover, if a requirement imposed
by a grading provision is a material element of an offense for purposes of
section 2.02(3), it should count as a material element for purposes of
section 2.02(4). Therefore, the MPC surely does not mean what it says
when it limits section 2.02(4)’s application to offense definitions.
Nevertheless, by its terms, section 2.02(4) appears to exclude offense
elements that appear in grading provisions.75As will be discussed later,
many state criminal codes also limit their stated-culpability provisions to
the elements that appear in offense definitions.76 Predictably, several
courts have imposed absolute liability for new offense elements that
appear in grading provisions.77
B. Applying Stated Culpability Requirements to All Offense Elements
In addition to being unclear about when section 2.02(4) applies, the
Code is unclear about how it applies. The Code’s first shortcoming in that
area occurs because section 2.02(4) too broadly applies a stated
culpability requirement to “all the material elements of the offense” when
an offense “prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material

The culpability provisions of Section 2.02 thus are fully applicable to the values used to
differentiate grades of theft.”) (citation omitted).
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 221.1 cmt. 4 at 81 (“It should be noted
finally that the phrase ‘dwelling of another at night’ relates to the ‘harm or evil . . . sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense’ and is thus a ‘material element’ of the
offense of burglary as that term is used in Sections 1.13(9), 1.13(10), and 2.02. The
consequence is that a culpability level of recklessness is established by Section 2.02(3) for
this element and that mistakes by the defendant will be governed by the general provisions
of Section 2.04.”).
74. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
75. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
76. See infra Section III.A.
77. See infra Section III.D.
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elements thereof.”78 To understand why section 2.02(4) is too broad, it is
helpful to first review some more straightforward examples of how the
drafters intended for section 2.02(4) to apply. As discussed below, the
provision is generally implicated in three situations. The Code handles
the first two situations very well, but it struggles with the third.
1.

Series of Consecutive Offense Elements

The first common statutory pattern occurs when an offense states a
culpability requirement that is followed by a series of consecutive
objective elements. For example, the MPC states that reckless
endangerment occurs when one “recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious
bodily injury.”79 The stated culpability requirement, “recklessly,”
immediately precedes “engages in conduct,” which is followed by the
phrase “which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.”80 Additionally, those elements are uninterrupted,
as they continue the offense’s main clause without adding any language
that might be understood as distinguishing the requirement of
endangerment from the offense’s conduct element.81
The same statutory pattern occurs when an offense states a
culpability requirement in an introductory clause that continues in a
subsection. The Code defines arson, for instance, to occur when one
“starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a
building or occupied structure of another.”82 Setting aside the first
requirement of starting a fire or causing an explosion, note that the
offense prescribes a culpability requirement of purpose, followed
immediately by the consecutive offense elements of (1) destroying (2) a
building or occupied structure (3) of another.83 Moreover, those elements
are not interrupted by any language suggesting that purpose may be
required only as to “destroying.”84
When this statutory pattern occurs, the Code’s commentary correctly
explains that section 2.02(4) applies to all the objective elements that
immediately follow a stated culpability level.85 As discussed earlier, the
Code’s definition of reckless endangerment requires that one “recklessly

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
1985).

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
Id. § 211.2.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 220.1(1).
Id.
See id.
See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 1 at 229–30 (AM. L. INST.

2022]

STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1225

engage[] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger
of death or serious bodily injury.”86 The commentary for the offense
makes clear that section 2.02(4) requires recklessness for both the actor’s
conduct and the result of endangering another person.87 Applying the
definition of recklessness to the endangerment requirement, the
commentary states that “the actor must perceive and consciously
disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his action will or may
place another in danger of death or serious [bodily] injury.”88 Absolute
liability is inappropriate for the requirement of endangerment, the
commentary explains, because the recklessness requirement “excludes
. . . unconscious risk creation.”89
Likewise, absolute liability is inappropriate for one form of arson
because the offense explicitly requires that the defendant act “with the
purpose of . . . destroying a building or occupied structure of another.”90
The commentary confirms that purpose is required both for destroying a
building or occupied structure91 and for the fact that the property belongs
to another.92 Moreover, the MPC’s commentary reaches the same result
for other offenses in which culpability requirements are immediately
followed by consecutive, uninterrupted, objective elements.93
The commentary is correct in applying stated culpability
requirements to such offense elements. After all, section 2.02(4)’s central
function is to resolve the ambiguity that is created when a single
culpability requirement precedes a series of objective elements.94 In such
a situation, the stated culpability requirement should apply to each
objective element.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2.
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 211.2 cmt. 3 at 203.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(a).
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 220.1 cmt. 4 at 16–18 n.63 (AM.
L. INST. 1980) (“Under the Model Penal Code, the requirement of a purpose to destroy a
building or occupied structure means that the actor must know of the characteristics of the
place to be destroyed, although of course he need not know that it is legally classified as a
‘building or occupied structure’ by the law of arson.”).
92. Id. § 220.1 cmt. 6 at 22–23 (“Paragraph (1)(a) does adopt the conclusion . . . that
second-degree felony sanctions should be reserved for a purpose to destroy the property ‘of
another.’”).
93. See, e.g., id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 451–52 (explaining that section 2.02(4) requires
knowledge for “all elements” of endangering welfare of children); id. § 250.9 cmt. 2 at 415
n.14 (explaining that section 2.02(4) requires purposefulness for “all material elements” of
desecrating venerated objects).
94. See id. § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245 (“Subsection (4) seeks to assist in the resolution of a
common ambiguity in penal legislation, the statement of a particular culpability
requirement in the definition of an offense in such a way that it is unclear whether the
requirement applies to all the elements of the offense or only to the element that it
immediately introduces.”).
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Consecutive Offense Elements That Are Arguably Interrupted

The MPC is also generally effective in handling the second common
statutory pattern implicating section 2.02(4). The second pattern occurs
when an offense states a culpability requirement that is immediately
followed by consecutive objective elements that are arguably interrupted
by language that distinguishes them.95 Such interruptions may occur if a
word or phrase introduces an offense element in a way that suggests that
the stated culpability requirement might not apply.
For example, the Code defines the offense of felonious restraint to
apply when one “knowingly: (a) restrains another unlawfully in
circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury.”96 Under
section 2.02(4), it is clear that the offense requires knowledge both for
restraining another and doing so unlawfully.97 Arguably, however,
section 2.02(4) dictates a different result for the element of exposing the
victim to the risk of serious bodily injury. That element immediately
follows the phrase “in circumstances,” which could be understood to
distinguish that element from the ones for which knowledge is required.98
The Code’s commentary, however, makes clear that the phrase “in
circumstances” does not preclude section 2.02(4) from requiring
knowledge as to endangerment.99
False imprisonment provides a second example of interrupting
language that arguably distinguishes offense elements. Under the Code,
false imprisonment occurs when one “knowingly restrains another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.”100 Again,
section 2.02(4) plainly requires knowledge for restraining another and
doing it unlawfully,101 but it is less clear what culpability is required for
interfering with the victim’s liberty. That element appears right after the
phrase “so as to,” which some might interpret to distinguish the last
objective element from the first two.102 Unfortunately, the commentary

95. See id.; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.2(a), 212.3 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.2(a) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
97. See id. § 2.02(4).
98. See id. § 212.2(a).
99. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 212.2 cmt. 2 at 241–42 (AM. L.
INST. 1985) (“[I]t should be noted that Section 212.2 requires proof that the accused acted
knowingly. Thus, he must have been aware that he was restraining his victim, that the
restraint was unlawful, and that it exposed the victim to physical danger.”).
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3.
101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (citing MODEL PENAL CODE &
COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245).
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3.
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fails to address how section 2.02 applies to the requirement of substantial
interference with liberty.103
Hence, the commentary does not provide much guidance about how
to approach stated culpability requirements for consecutive objective
elements that are arguably interrupted. The commentary suggests that
such language does not preclude the application of a stated culpability
requirement, and that seems to be the right result.104 In any event, it is
apparent that the drafters did not intend for section 2.02(4) to authorize
the imposition of absolute liability.105 Even assuming that interrupting
language somehow distinguishes one offense element from others, a
culpability requirement of recklessness should be imposed under section
2.02(3).106
3.

Offense Elements That Are Distinguished Grammatically

The Code struggles most with the third and final common statutory
pattern implicating section 2.02(4). The pattern occurs when an offense
states a culpability requirement in one part of a sentence, and another
part requires an objective element without specifying a mental state. 107
Problems arise most commonly when an offense requires that a
defendant act with a particular purpose that does not correspond to any
objective elements.108 When an offense requires such “specific” or
“ulterior” intent, the offense definition typically distinguishes the
culpability requirement from the remaining elements grammatically.109
The same pattern can occur when an offense indicates grammatically
that a culpability requirement applies to some objective elements but not
others.110
As Paul Robinson has noted, section 2.02(4) risks applying a stated
culpability requirement to all offense elements when a more limited
application is intended.111 Professor Robinson gives two examples, both
of which involve offenses with specific-intent requirements.112 The first
example is burglary,113 which the MPC defines to occur when one “enters
a building or occupied structure . . . with purpose to commit a crime
103. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245–46.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (requiring, at minimum, recklessness when a
culpability level is not prescribed for an offense element).
107. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at § 61(b)(6).
108. See id. § 61(b)(8).
109. See id. § 61(a)(2).
110. See id. § 61(b)(6).
111. Id.
112. Id. §§ 61(b)(6), (7).
113. Id. § 61(b)(6).
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therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the
actor is licensed or privileged to enter.”114 Because the offense definition
requires the actor to have a “purpose to commit a crime,”115 section
2.02(4) might be read to require purpose as to every other element of the
offense. Professor Robinson’s second example, harassment,116 is
committed when, acting “with purpose to harass another, [one] . . .
insults . . . another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly
response.”117 If section 2.02(4) is applied literally, it may require purpose
for all offense elements, demanding that a defendant intentionally insult
another for the purpose of provoking a violent or disorderly response.118
In applying stated culpability requirements so broadly, the Code puts
section 2.02(4) at tension with section 2.02(3).119 Under section 2.02(3),
recklessness, at a minimum, is required for any offense element that
lacks a prescribed culpability level.120 But if section 2.02(4) applies a
stated culpability level to every element of the offense, there is no room
for section 2.02(3) to operate because all offense elements have prescribed
culpability levels.121 Hence, as a practical matter, section 2.02(4)
threatens to limit section 2.02(3)’s application to offenses that fail to state
any culpability requirements at all.
Regrettably, the Code’s commentary fails to clarify how section 2.02
applies to offense elements that are grammatically distinguished from
culpability requirements.122 Section 2.02’s commentary never explains
how an offense may distinguish between offense elements.123 Instead, the
commentary vaguely observes that “[w]hen a distinction is intended, as
it often is, proper drafting ought to make it clear.”124 But elsewhere, the
commentary is inconsistent about whether particular offenses
distinguish between offense elements. When they do, section 2.02(3)
requires at least recklessness for any offense element that lacks a
prescribed culpability level.125 But if section 2.02(4) applies, the stated
culpability requirement attaches to all offense elements. 126
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
115. See id. § 2.02(4); see also ROBINSON, supra note 10, at § 61(b)(6).
116. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at § 61(b)(7).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4.
118. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at § 61(b)(7).
119. Id.
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (requiring conduct committed recklessly, knowingly,
or purposely for offense elements lacking a prescribed culpability level).
121. See id.
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245–46 (AM. L. INST.
1985).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 245.
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3).
126. Id. § 2.02(4).
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The commentary’s inconsistency is illustrated by the offenses of
resisting arrest and theft of lost property, which use similar forms.127
First, a person resists arrest under the Code “if, for the purpose of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging
any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or
requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.”128 Note that the
offense requires a purpose to prevent a public servant from making a
lawful arrest or performing another duty.129 After imposing that
requirement, the definition uses a comma to begin a new clause that
requires objective elements without introducing a new culpability
requirement.130
Similarly, the Code defines theft of lost property by using commas to
begin new clauses after stating the culpability requirements of
knowledge and purpose:
A person who comes into control of property of another that he
knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as
to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the
recipient is guilty of theft if, with purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the
property to a person entitled to have it.131
Grammatically, the culpability level of knowledge seems to apply
only to the requirement that the property was “lost, mislaid, or delivered
under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity
of the recipient.”132 Following that clause, the offense definition then
imposes a specific-intent requirement of a purpose to deprive the owner
of the property at issue.133 Finally, the offense definition’s last clause
requires that the actor fail to take reasonable measures to restore that
property to the owner without prescribing a culpability requirement.134
Analytically, there is no meaningful difference between the offense
definition for resisting arrest and the last part of the offense definition
for theft of lost property. Both impose specific-intent requirements and
then begin new clauses that require objective elements without

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id. §§ 242.2, 223.5.
Id. § 242.2.
See id.
See id.
Id. § 223.5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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specifying new culpability requirements.135 Nevertheless, the MPC’s
commentary treats the two offenses very differently. For resisting arrest,
the commentary notes that the culpability requirement of purpose does
not apply to the offense’s objective elements.136 Instead, citing section
2.02(3), the commentary states that “recklessness will suffice with
respect to the elements that the actor created a substantial risk of bodily
harm or that the means he employed justified or required substantial
force to overcome the resistance.”137 In contrast, the MPC’s commentary
states that section 2.02(4), rather than subsection section 2.02(3),
governs the last clause of the offense definition for theft of lost
property.138 Revealingly, the commentary is also inconsistent in its
treatment of other offenses that grammatically distinguish clauses with
objective elements from those with stated culpability requirements.139
As discussed earlier, section 2.02(4) is generally effective in applying
a stated culpability requirement to consecutive objective elements that
appear in the same part of the sentence.140 The Code properly recognizes
that the culpability requirement applies to such elements because the
offense fails to distinguish between them even if it uses minor
interrupting language.141 The MPC struggles with culpability
requirements, however, when an offense distinguishes between objective
elements using punctuation, syntax, or both.142 For offenses that
distinguish between elements grammatically, section 2.02(4) goes too far
in applying a stated culpability requirement to all the elements of the
offense.143 That broad rule precludes the application of section 2.02(3),
135. See id. §§ 242.2, 223.5.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 242.2 cmt. 7 at 220 (AM. L. INST.
1980).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 223.5 cmt. 2 at 227 n.8. Confusingly, the commentary applies a culpability
requirement of knowledge, rather than purpose, for the requirement of failing to take
reasonable measures to restore property to the owner. See id. (“By operation of Section
2.02(4) . . . the knowledge requirement of Section 223.5 is fully applicable to the
requirement that the actor fail to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a
person entitled to have it.”). The commentary seems to refer to the first part of the offense
definition, which requires that the actor know that the property was “lost, mislaid, or
delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the
recipient.” See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5. But the offense’s second clause imposes an
intervening culpability requirement of a “purpose to deprive the owner” of the property. See
id. The commentary fails to address the proper scope of that culpability requirement.
139. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 223.2(1) cmt. 7 at 177–78
(applying section 2.02(3) to theft by unlawful taking), and id. § 224.1 cmt. 5(c) at 300
(applying section 2.02(3) to forgery), with id. § 223.8 cmt. 2(c) at 268–69 (applying section
2.02(4) to theft by failure to make required disposition).
140. See supra Section II.B.2.
141. See supra Section II.B.2.
142. See supra Section II.B.3.
143. See supra Section II.B.3.
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which requires proof of recklessness for any element that lacks a
culpability level after applying section 2.02(4).144
C. Providing a Legislative-Intent Exception
The Code’s final major shortcoming is in providing a legislativeintent exception in section 2.02(4). When an offense states a culpability
requirement without distinguishing between offense elements, the stated
culpability requirement applies to each element “unless a contrary
purpose plainly appears.”145 Section 2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception
is redundant at best; at worst, it threatens to undermine the Code’s
culpability scheme by authorizing the imposition of absolute liability.
The MPC’s commentary says little about section 2.02(4)’s legislativeintent exception. The drafters justified the exception’s inclusion because
the Code adopts “the view that if a particular kind of culpability has been
articulated at all by the legislature as sufficient with respect to any
element of the offense, the assumption is that it was meant to apply to
all material elements.”146 As discussed above, however, section 2.02(4) is
sometimes too broad in applying a stated culpability requirement to all
objective elements of an offense.147 That rule of construction is
particularly problematic when an offense indicates grammatically that a
culpability requirement applies to some objective elements but not
others. But rather than restrict a stated-culpability provision’s
application to particular elements, the drafters chose to rein in section
2.02(4) with an exception that itself is quite broad.148
The drafters’ approach is puzzling for three reasons. First, the Code’s
default culpability provision, section 2.02(3), does not provide a
legislative-intent exception.149 If anything, such an exception makes far
more sense for a default culpability provision than for a stated-culpability
provision; by its nature, the latter applies when an offense explicitly
prescribes a mental state.150 In contrast, a default culpability provision
imposes culpability requirements when an offense is silent about
culpability.151 To say the least, the drafters made an odd choice in
permitting legislative intent to trump a statute’s plain language but not
trump an interpretive rule like section 2.02(3).

144.
145.
146.
1985).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3).
Id. § 2.02(4).
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02(4) cmt. 6 at 245 (AM. L. INST.
See supra Section II.B.3.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
See id. § 2.02(3).
See id. § 2.02(4).
See id. § 2.02(3).
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Second, the legislative-intent exception is largely redundant because
section 2.02(4) is limited to offense definitions that prescribe culpability
requirements “without distinguishing” between objective elements.152
Presumably, when an offense does meaningfully distinguish between
objective elements, section 2.02(4) is not even implicated. In fact, the
commentary states that a legislature can draft any offense in a way that
makes clear that “a distinction is intended.”153 But if an offense clearly
limits the application of a stated culpability requirement, it necessarily
specifies a mental state in a way that distinguishes between offense
elements.154 Hence, section 2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception seems
completely superfluous.
Finally, if the legislative-intent exception has any effect, it is to
significantly weaken stated culpability requirements. To have meaning,
the phrase “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears” must provide an
exception to the ordinary rule that a culpability requirement applies to
more than just the first element it precedes.155 Under this reading of the
provision, the legislative-intent exception precludes the application of a
stated culpability requirement even if the statute prescribes a mental
state without distinguishing between offense elements. 156 The exception
could apply, then, even when an offense prescribes a culpability
requirement that applies to consecutive objective elements that appear
in the same part of the sentence. Put differently, the exception possibly
creates a loophole permitting the imposition of absolute liability.
Of course, absolute liability was the last thing that the MPC’s
drafters wanted. For that reason, section 2.02(1) generally requires
culpability for each objective element of an offense,157 and section 2.05
authorizes absolute liability only in extremely limited circumstances.158
Nevertheless, as explained next in Part III, numerous state courts have
seized on section 2.02(4)’s weaknesses to justify the imposition of
absolute liability.

152. Id. § 2.02(4).
153. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02(4) cmt. 6 at 245 (AM. L. INST.
1985).
154. See id. (“When a distinction is intended, as it often is, proper drafting ought to make
it clear.”).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
158. See id. § 2.05.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS IN MODEL
PENAL CODE STATES
To date, twenty-five states have enacted culpability provisions
influenced significantly by the MPC: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.159 Section 2.02(4) has been particularly
influential, with nineteen states including similar stated-culpability
provisions in their criminal codes.160 Hence, only six MPC states lack
rules like section 2.02(4) despite otherwise being influenced by the Code’s
culpability rules: Alaska, Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and
Utah.161
159. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-1 to -6 (2021); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.81.600–.620 (West
2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-201 to -204 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-201 to -206
(West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1-501 to -504 (West 2021); C ONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53a-5 to -6 (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 251–64 (West 2021); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204 to -220 (West 2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3 to 4-9 (West
2021); IND . CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5202 to -5204, -5207
(West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.010–.070 (West 2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 32–36 (West 2021); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.016–.031 (West 2021); MONT . CODE
ANN. §§ 45-2-101 to -104 (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 626:2–:3 (2021); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:2-2 to -4 (West 2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.00–.20 (McKinney 2021); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-02-02 to -05 (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.20–.22
(West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.085–.115 (West 2021); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 302–05 (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-301 to -302 (West 2021); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.02–.04 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-102 to -104 (West
2021).
My list is the same as that of Dannye Holley. See Holley, supra note 7, at 236–53. Darryl
Brown used a similar list for his survey of states that have codified versions of MPC sections
2.02(3) and (4). See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict
Liability, 62 DUKE L.J. 285, 289 n.8 (2012). My survey differs from Professor Brown’s only
by including Montana. Significantly, Montana has enacted a stated-culpability provision
influenced by section 2.02(4) of the MPC. See id.; MONT . CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(4).
160. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(A); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2203(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-503(4); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 252; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-207; 720 ILL . COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(d); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(f); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 34(2); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(4); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:2(I); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(1); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-02-02(3); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(1); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 302(d).
161. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.610; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-11-301; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102. Ohio has a
code provision that addresses stated culpability requirements, but it does not purport to
clarify their proper scope. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(A)(2) (requiring “the
requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is
specified by the language defining the offense”).
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Among the nineteen states with stated-culpability provisions, nine
have provisions that are identical or nearly identical to section 2.02(4). 162
Eight states differ from the MPC mostly in omitting either section
2.02(4)’s language about distinguishing between offense elements,163 or
its legislative-intent exception,164 which are largely duplicative.165
Arkansas and Oregon have made more significant changes to their
stated-culpability provisions, but both states still generally follow section
2.02(4).166
As Darryl Brown observed in a previous survey of state culpability
provisions, the MPC’s culpability presumptions “have had surprisingly
little effect on courts that define mens rea requirements when
interpreting criminal statutes.”167 In general, MPC jurisdictions have
been quite willing to impose absolute liability even for serious criminal
offenses,168 and states’ alterations to section 2.02(4) “explain[] little of the
trend of state decisions” concerning absolute liability.169 My view is that
MPC jurisdictions’ stated-culpability provisions often fail to prevent
absolute liability because, like section 2.02(4) itself, they are deeply
flawed. As a result, states’ deviations from section 2.02(4) make little
difference. In fact, jurisdictions with stated-culpability provisions are
just as likely to impose absolute liability as states without such rules.

162. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(A); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 252; HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 702-207; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(f); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(2);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:22(c)(1); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d).
163. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-503(4); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-5; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(1); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-02-02(3); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(1).
164. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(d); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-02-02(3); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021.
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); supra
notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
166. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(a) (West 2021) (“If a statute defining an offense
prescribes a culpable mental state and does not clearly indicate that the culpable mental
state applies to less than all of the elements of the offense, the prescribed culpable mental
state applies to each element of the offense.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(1) (“If a
statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the
element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material
element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”).
167. Brown, supra note 159, at 285.
168. See id. at 297 (finding “widespread judicial endorsement of strict-liability elements”
in MPC states and concluding that the Code’s culpability provisions “have had only modest
effect”).
169. Id. at 319–21. Professor Brown’s assessment was based on his review of decisions
interpreting both sections 2.02(3) and (4) of the MPC. See id. In a previous article, I reached
a different conclusion than Professor Brown about the significance of states’ deviations from
section 2.02(3). See England, supra note 54, at 83 n.248 and accompanying text.
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This Part discusses four main ways in which state courts have erred
in applying stated culpability requirements. First, many state courts
refuse on principle to apply prescribed mental states to offense elements
that appear in grading provisions. Second, some courts have illogically
applied stated culpability requirements to offense elements even though
they are distinguished from other requirements. Third, numerous courts
ignore stated culpability requirements based on weak evidence of
legislative intent. Finally, when state courts decline to apply prescribed
mental states, they also routinely disregard criminal codes’ default
culpability rules.
A. Failing to Apply Stated Culpability Requirements to Grading
Provisions
As discussed earlier, section 2.02(4) is too narrow since it applies only
when “the law defining an offense” states a culpability requirement
without distinguishing between objective elements.170 The MPC’s
commentary reveals that the drafters intended for the Code’s culpability
rules to apply beyond offense definitions, including to grading
provisions.171 Nevertheless, by its terms, section 2.02(4) appears to
exclude offense elements that appear outside offense definitions.172
MPC jurisdictions have overwhelmingly followed suit. In fact, in
every MPC state with a rule modeled after section 2.02(4), the provision
applies only to statutes defining offenses.173 In other words, the only MPC
jurisdictions without such a limitation are the six states that lack statedculpability provisions.174 In states both with and without rules influenced
by section 2.02(4), courts have generally struggled in applying stated
culpability requirements to grading provisions. In fact, courts often
impose absolute liability not only for grading provisions but also for
170. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
173. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(a) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(A) (2021); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(a) (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-503(4) (West 2021);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 252 (West 2021);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-207 (West 2021); 720 ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West
2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(d) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(f) (West
2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(2) (West 2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(2)
(West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(4) (West 2021); N.H. R EV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I)
(2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(1) (West 2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(1) (McKinney
2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-02-02(3)(a) (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.115(1) (West 2021); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d) (West 2021).
174. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.610 (West 2021); KY . REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040
(West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(2) (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301
(West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (West
2021).
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statutes that define aggravated offenses. Sadly, jurisdictions with statedculpability provisions have fared no better than jurisdictions without
them.
Courts often limit their states’ versions of section 2.02(4) by
distinguishing requirements in grading provisions from other offense
requirements. In People v. Scheffer, for example, the Colorado Court of
Appeals interpreted an offense that criminalizes the possession of a
controlled substance.175 There, the statute at issue provides that “it is
unlawful for any person knowingly to . . . possess . . . a controlled
substance” with intent to distribute it.176 At the time, the statute graded
the offense more seriously if it involved more than one gram of a schedule
II controlled substance than if it involved one gram or less.177 The court
observed that the grading provisions at issue did not require culpability
as to the amount of a controlled substance possessed.178 The defendant
argued that under Colorado’s version of section 2.02(4), the culpability
requirement of knowledge applied to every element of the offense,
including the weight of the drugs he was charged with possessing.179 The
court rejected the defendant’s argument, reasoning that requirements for
aggravating offenses “are generally regarded and treated as sentence
enhancement provisions, not essential elements of an offense.”180 The
court concluded that a requirement that appears in a grading provision
is not an offense element because “[a] defendant still may be convicted of
the underlying offense without any proof of the sentence enhancer.”181
Other courts have sidestepped states’ versions of section 2.02(4) by
distinguishing offense definitions for aggravated crimes from ordinary
offense definitions. For example, New York’s Appellate Division recently
interpreted the culpability requirements for an offense that criminalizes
assaulting an elderly person in People v. Burman.182 The offense provides
that a person commits the felony of second-degree assault when, “[w]ith
intent to cause physical injury to a person who is sixty-five years of age
175. People v. Scheffer, 224 P.3d 279, 287–88 (Colo. App. 2009).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-18-405(1)(a) (West 2022).
177. See Scheffer, 224 P.3d at 287–88 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-18405(2)(a)(I)(A), (2.3)(a)).
178. Id. at 288.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 580 (Colo. 1993)). The Scheffer
court erred in distinguishing grading requirements from offense elements, but it likely still
reached the right conclusion under Colorado law. As the court observed later in the opinion,
a stated culpability level is not required for an element when a statute plainly limits its
application. Id. at 290 (citing § 18-1-503(4)). The statute at issue in Scheffer plainly limited
the application of the knowledge requirement because the grading provision appeared as a
separate sentence with its own subsection. See id.
182. People v. Burman, 102 N.Y.S.3d 850, 850–51 (App. Div. 2019).
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or older, he or she causes such injury to such person, and the actor is
more than ten years younger than such person.”183 Significantly, the
statute explicitly requires “intent to cause physical injury to a person who
is sixty-five years of age or older.”184 New York’s stated-culpability
provision states that when an offense prescribes “one and only one”
mental state, “it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense
unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”185 Although the
offense definition therefore requires intent as to the victim’s age, the
Burman court refused to require any culpability as to that element.186
The court reasoned, in part, that the offense is intended to aggravate
assault to a felony when the victim is elderly.187 Quoting the New York
Court of Appeals, the court observed that the criminal code “is replete
with offenses which . . . elevate the degree of criminal responsibility
without coupling a requirement of proof of a culpable mental state.”188
Similarly, Indiana courts circumvent the state’s stated-culpability
provision by characterizing elements as mere “aggravating
circumstances.”189 For instance, in Markley v. State, the Indiana Court of
Appeals held that the state’s version of section 2.02(4) did not apply to a
provision that aggravated the offense of battery when a defendant caused
serious bodily injury.190 The court concluded that serious bodily injury
was an offense element, but it was not an “element of the prohibited
conduct” as required under Indiana’s stated-culpability provision.191
Rather, the court characterized the requirement as “an aggravating
circumstance which . . . increases the penalty for the offense committed
without proof of any culpability separate from the culpability required
for the conduct elements of the offense.”192 As a result, the mental state
183. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(12) (McKinney 2021).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 15.15(1).
186. Burman, 102 N.Y.S.3d at 852–53.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 852 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d 701, 703 (N.Y. 1991)). Similarly,
in another case, the appellate division held that culpability was not required as to the
proximity of a drug sale to a school. People v. Gonzalez, 658 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (App. Div.
1997) (“The ‘school grounds’ element is clearly an aggravating factor, designed to increase
the penalties for certain types of drug sales, and the structure of the statute is essentially
the same as statutes in which the culpable mental state has been held inapplicable to an
aggravating factor.”).
189. See, e.g., Markley v. State, 421 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
190. Id. at 21–22.
191. Id. at 21 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(d) (West 2021)).
192. Id. Likewise, in Owens v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the state’s
version of section 2.02(4) did not apply to a provision that graded battery as a felony if the
victim was a law enforcement officer. 742 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Following
Markley, the court held “that the element of ‘bodily injury to a law enforcement officer’ is
an aggravating circumstance, which . . . increases the penalty for the offense committed
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required for ordinary battery did not apply.193 More recently, in Foster v.
State, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that aggravated battery
also did not require culpability as to the extent of injury even though the
offense was defined as “knowingly inflict[ing] injury on a person that
causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member
or organ.”194 According to the court, Indiana’s stated-culpability provision
did not apply because the requirement was “an aggravating
circumstantial element, rather than an additional element of prohibited
conduct.”195
Courts have drawn similar distinctions in MPC states that lack
provisions like section 2.02(4). For example, in State v. Wilcox, the Ohio
Court of Appeals declined to require any culpability as to whether the
defendant knew the victim of an assault was a peace officer.196 The court
concluded that strict liability was appropriate because the grading
provision did not prescribe a mental state and “simply enhance[d] the
degree of the offense and potential penalty.”197 Likewise, in Price v. State,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted a grading provision that
aggravates assault when “the offense is committed by intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of
the blood of the person by applying pressure to the person’s throat or neck
or by blocking the person’s nose or mouth.”198 The court determined the
scope of the offense’s culpability requirement was based on what it called
“the gravamen of the offense.”199 The court concluded that bodily injury
was the sole gravamen, meaning that no culpability was required as to
the defendant’s conduct in applying pressure to the victim’s throat or
neck or blocking the victim’s nose or mouth.200 Strict liability was
appropriate for those elements, the court reasoned, because the conduct
was “clearly wrongful . . . regardless of the means used to effect the
result.”201
without proof of any culpability separate from the culpability required for the conduct
elements of the offense.” Id.
193. See Markley, 421 N.E.2d at 22.
194. Foster v. State, No. 53A01-1209-CR-414, 2013 WL 3376962, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App.
July 8, 2013) (quoting § 35-42-2-1.5(2)).
195. Id. at *3.
196. State v. Wilcox, 827 N.E.2d 832, 834 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
197. Id. at 833; see also State v. Watson, No. CA2005-12-038, 2007 WL 97592, at *2–3
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007).
198. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West 2021)).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 442–43.
201. Id. at 443. In an earlier case, McQueen v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
interpreted the offense definition for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, which occurs
when a person “intentionally or knowingly operates another’s boat, airplane, or motorpropelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.” 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex.
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is hardly alone in using
normative judgments about blameworthiness to interpret offenses’
culpability requirements. For instance, the Alaska Court of Appeals
interpreted an offense definition for second-degree criminal mischief in
Ortberg v. State.202 At the time, a person committed the offense if “having
no right to do so . . . [and] with intent to damage property of another, the
person damage[d] property of another in an amount of $500 or more.”203
The court held that no culpability was required as to the extent of the
damage because the remaining offense elements demonstrated “an
awareness or consciousness of wrongdoing.”204 Finally, in Commonwealth
v. Flemings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to apply a stated
culpability requirement without even addressing the state’s version of
section 2.02(4).205 The offense at issue was aggravated assault, which
occurred at the time when one “knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to a
police officer . . . in the performance of duty.”206 Perplexingly, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a similar
federal statute,207 which, of course, was not binding. The Flemings court
concluded that a defendant is sufficiently blameworthy in committing
any assault, and thus the defendant “must take his victim as he finds
him.”208 Hence, despite the offense’s plain language, the defendant did
not need to know that the victim was a police officer.209
Crim. App. 1989) (quoting PENAL § 31.07(a)). The court held that the statute required
knowledge for all elements of the offense, including the owner’s lack of consent. Id. at 604.
The statute requires knowledge for that element, the court reasoned, because it “separates
lawful operation of another’s motor vehicle from unauthorized use.” Id. Grammatically, the
offenses in Price and McQueen are essentially the same because they prescribe culpability
requirements followed by consecutive, uninterrupted objective elements. Unlike Texas
courts, the MPC would require culpability for both statutes because section 2.02(4) does not
distinguish aggravating elements from other offense elements. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
202. See Ortberg v. State, 751 P.2d 1368, 1374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (discussing
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.46.482(a)(1) (West 2021)).
203. Id.
204. Id. On appeal, the state correctly observed that Alaska’s default culpability
provision requires recklessness as to the extent of damage. See id. (citing § 11.81.610(b)).
But the court rejected the argument, instead holding that the statute imposes absolute
liability. Id.
205. See Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282, 1283–84 (Pa. 1995).
206. Id. at 1283. In State v. Reed, the Missouri Court of Appeals interpreted a similar
statute. See 402 S.W.3d 146, 150–51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). The court correctly concluded that
the statute required the defendant to know that the victims were police officers. Id. at 150.
207. See Flemings, 652 A.2d at 1284 (discussing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671
(1975)).
208. Id. at 1285.
209. Id. The holding in Flemings seems to violate Pennsylvania’s rule that penal statutes
should be strictly construed. See 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)(1) (West 2021).
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself has recognized, strict construction requires that
“where doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal statute, it is the accused who
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In total, then, at least seven MPC states have declined to apply
prescribed mental states to elements because they enhance criminal
liability. In doing so, courts seem to assume that culpability is not
required for elements that aggravate conduct that is already criminal.210
That assumption finds some support in the MPC itself, given that section
2.02(4) seems to apply only to offense definitions.211 Nevertheless, in
imposing absolute liability for aggravating elements, courts have strayed
far from the drafters’ vision for criminal liability. The drafters intended
for section 2.02 to apply to all elements, including ones that aggravate
criminal liability.212 Moreover, grading distinctions, like those between
guilt and innocence, should reflect actors’ relative blameworthiness.
That, in turn, depends in no small part on culpability, which the Code
generally requires for every material element of an offense.213 Courts
should never circumvent that requirement based on their own judgments
about defendants’ blameworthiness.
B. Applying Stated Culpability Requirements Too Broadly
When courts in MPC states err in applying stated culpability
requirements, they usually do so in ways that benefit prosecutors. But in
a few states, courts have interpreted culpability requirements in ways
that hinder prosecution. As discussed earlier, section 2.02(4) is too broad
in applying a stated culpability requirement to all offense elements. 214
The Code particularly struggles when an offense prescribes a mental
state in one part of a sentence, and another part requires an objective
element without prescribing a new mental state.215 In such a situation, it
can be unclear whether the objective element requires the stated
culpability level or the default culpability level of recklessness. 216
Likewise, in all nineteen states with stated-culpability provisions
like section 2.02(4), prescribed mental states apply to all offense elements

should receive the benefit of such doubt.” Commonwealth v. Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa.
2001). Hence, even assuming that the offense at issue in Flemings was ambiguous, the court
should have resolved the ambiguity in the defendant’s favor by requiring knowledge that
the victim was a police officer.
210. For similar reasons, Darryl Brown has observed that the “prevailing principle,”
even in MPC jurisdictions, is that “no proof of culpability is required beyond that needed to
ensure that an actor is not convicted for purely innocent conduct.” Brown, supra note 159,
at 324–25. Under current law, culpability requirements serve “primarily, and often
exclusively, to distinguish innocent actors from guilty ones.” Id. at 325.
211. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
212. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
213. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).
214. See supra Section II.B.3.
215. See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 119–34 and accompanying text.
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in the absence of contrary legislative intent.217 As this Article will discuss
in Section III.C, many courts are all too eager to find legislative intent to
evade a prescribed culpability level.218 In a few states, however, courts
have applied stated culpability requirements too broadly.219 The problem
occurs, as under the MPC, when offenses indicate grammatically that
they do not apply to every objective element.220
In at least four states, courts have applied stated culpability levels to
offense elements even though they are distinguished grammatically by
punctuation, syntax, or both. The problem arises in two situations. The
first situation is the one that creates problems for the MPC: an offense
definition states a culpability requirement in one clause, and another
clause requires an offense element without stating a culpability level.
Additionally, some states err when a statute distinguishes an element
from others by requiring it in a completely separate provision. Both
situations will be discussed in turn.
1.

Applying Stated Culpability Requirements Too Broadly in
Offense Definitions

First, at least three states have applied stated culpability levels to
offense elements that are distinguished grammatically within offense
definitions. Those states are Arkansas, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, and
all three have enacted both stated-culpability provisions like section
2.02(4)221 and default culpability provisions modeled after section
2.02(3).222 As a result, when determining the culpability required for an
objective element, courts in the three states should always choose
between any stated mental states and the default level of recklessness.
In all three states, however, courts have broadly applied stated

217. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(a) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(A) (2021); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(a) (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-503(4) (West 2021);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 252 (West 2021);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-207 (West 2021); 720 ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West
2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2(d) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(f) (West
2021); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(2) (West 2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(1)–(2) (West
2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(4) (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I) (2021);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(1) (West 2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(1) (McKinney 2021);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-02-02(3) (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(1) (West
2021); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d) (West 2021).
218. See infra Section III.C.
219. See infra Section III.B.1.
220. See infra Section III.B.1.
221. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(a) (West 2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-207 (West
2021); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d) (West 2021).
222. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204; 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c).
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culpability levels without even considering the possibility of requiring
recklessness.
For example, the Arkansas Court of Appeals recently interpreted the
culpability requirements for kidnapping in Wallace v. State.223 The
defendant argued that he was entitled to a lesser-included-offense
instruction for false imprisonment.224 In Arkansas, kidnapping occurs if
one “‘restrains another person so as to interfere substantially with the
other person’s liberty with the purpose of: terrorizing the other person or
another person.’”225 Thus, purpose appears to be a specific-intent
requirement that does not apply to the offense’s objective elements. After
all, the word “purpose” appears after the requirement of restraining the
victim in a way that substantially interferes with his or her liberty.226
Nevertheless, the court agreed with the defendant’s premise that the
statute required a purpose to restrain the victim.227 The court ultimately
held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on false
imprisonment based on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Davis
v. State.228 In that case, the court also assumed that purpose was required
for all the objective elements of kidnapping, including the requirement of
restraint.229 Significantly, the Davis and Wallace courts both failed to
consider the possibility that recklessness might be required as to
restraint.230
The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals recently used a similar
approach for the offense of theft in State v. Gaub.231 In Gaub, the circuit
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the complaint
failed to sufficiently allege the culpability requirements for seconddegree theft.232 Under the governing statute, theft occurs when “[a]
person obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of
another with intent to deprive the [owner] of the property.”233 The offense
definition grammatically distinguishes the offense’s objective elements
from the culpability requirement of a purpose to deprive the owner of
223. See Wallace v. State, 537 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017).
224. Id. at 271–72.
225. Id. at 272 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-11-102(a)(6) (West 2021)).
226. Id.
227. See id. at 272.
228. See id. at 272–73 (referencing Davis v. State, 232 S.W.3d 476, 486–87 (Ark. 2006).
229. Davis, 232 S.W.3d at 486 (“The mental state required for kidnapping is ‘purposely’
. . . First-degree false imprisonment requires a culpable mental state of ‘knowingly.’
Knowingly is a lesser mental state than purposely.”) (quoting Moore v. State, CACR 03488, 2004 WL 161474, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004)).
230. See Davis, 232 S.W.3d at 486; Wallace, 537 S.W.3d at 272.
231. State v. Gaub, No. CAAP-15-0000547, 2017 WL 213513, at *6 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan.
18, 2017).
232. Id. at *1.
233. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-830(1) (West 2021).
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property.234 Hence, the court should have required recklessness for the
objective elements under Hawaii’s version of section 2.02(3). But the
court did not even address that possibility.235 Instead, applying the
state’s version of section 2.02(4), the court held that a defendant must
intend to obtain or exert control over the property of another.236
Finally, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied a stated culpability
requirement for trespass too broadly in Commonwealth v. Targonski.237
In that case, the alleged trespass occurred when the defendant
accidentally entered a neighbor’s apartment during a confrontation in a
hallway.238 Under Pennsylvania law, trespass occurs when a person,
“knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, . . . enters . . . any
building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion
thereof.”239 Significantly, the offense definition requires that the
defendant know only that he or she is not licensed or privileged to
enter.240 After that, the definition uses a comma to begin a new clause
that requires entry without prescribing a new mental state. 241 Because
the offense definition distinguishes between elements, recklessness
should be required for entry under Pennsylvania’s version of section
2.02(4). Although the offense definition distinguishes the element of
entry from the knowledge requirement, the court held that the statute
required the defendant to enter the apartment knowingly.242 The court
failed to even address the possibility of applying Pennsylvania’s default
culpability level of recklessness.243
Arkansas, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, much like the MPC, sometimes
apply stated culpability requirements too broadly in offense definitions.
In applying a stated culpability requirement even when an offense
distinguishes between elements, courts significantly limit the effect of
states’ default culpability provisions.244 Curiously, however, state courts
do not seem to even recognize that the two provisions are at tension.
Under state criminal codes, courts often face a choice between a
234. Id.
235. See Gaub, 2017 WL 213513, at *6.
236. Id.
237. See Commonwealth v. Targonski, No. 1758 MDA 2013, 2014 WL 10588466, at *3
(Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2014).
238. Id. at *1 (“While Arsenault was pushed up against his locked apartment door, his
roommate Rosan Patel heard commotion, looked out the peephole, and saw Arsenault being
punched. As Patel opened the door to let him in, Arsenault tumbled into the apartment,
followed by a ‘cascade’ of five to ten other people, including [Appellant].”).
239. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(a)(1)(i) (West 2020).
240. Id. § 3503(a)(1).
241. See id.
242. Targonski, 2014 WL 10588466, at *6.
243. See id. at *3–5.
244. See, e.g., id. at *4–6.
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prescribed mental state and a default culpability level. Courts often
perceive the choice, however, as being one between the stated culpability
level and absolute liability.245
2.

Applying Stated Culpability Requirements Too Broadly for
Grading Provisions

Courts in Hawaii and Oregon have also applied stated culpability
requirements too broadly for grading provisions. By their nature,
criminal codes always distinguish true grading provisions from offense
definitions. Indeed, grading provisions are codified as separate
sentences, and they frequently appear in their own sections or
subsections. Hence, section 2.02(4) should rarely, if ever, apply a
culpability requirement stated in an offense definition to a new objective
element in a grading provision. Rather, if a grading provision fails to
specify a culpability requirement for a new element, the Code imposes
the default culpability level of recklessness under section 2.02(3).246 As
discussed earlier, the MPC’s drafters made that clear in their
commentary about the grading provisions for burglary and theft.247
Similarly, Hawaii and Oregon have default culpability provisions
that require recklessness and negligence, respectively, for objective
elements that lack stated culpability requirements. 248 Hence, when a
grading provision fails to state a culpability requirement, a Hawaii court
should require recklessness, and an Oregon court should require
negligence. Courts in both states, however, have overlooked default
culpability provisions when determining the culpability requirements for
grading provisions. As a result, Oregon and Hawaii courts sometimes
conclude that they can prevent absolute liability only by applying a
culpability requirement stated separately in an offense definition.
By their own admission, Oregon courts have found culpability
requirements to be “a chronically vexing problem.”249 Oregon courts have
particularly struggled with the culpability requirements for grading
provisions, as shown by the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Blanton.250 The defendant in Blanton was convicted for furnishing
245. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
246. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(requiring recklessness “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of
an offense is not prescribed by law”).
247. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
248. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204 (West 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(2)
(West 2021).
249. State v. Schodrow, 66 P.3d 547, 549–50 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
250. State v. Blanton, 588 P.2d 591, 29–30 (Or. 1978). Another issue for Oregon has been
that its stated-culpability provision departs from section 2.02(4) by applying a prescribed
mental state to each offense element “that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”
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marijuana to a minor.251 At the time, the offense definition criminalized
“knowingly and unlawfully” furnishing drugs to another person, among
other things.252 The offense was ordinarily a Class B felony, but a
separate grading provision aggravated the offense to a Class A felony “if
the defendant [was] 18 years of age or over and the conviction is for
furnishing a narcotic or dangerous drug to a person under 18 years of age
and who is at least three years younger than the defendant.”253
Importantly, the grading provision did not prescribe any culpability
requirements as to the age of the person to whom a drug was provided.254
The court emphasized that, under Oregon’s version of MPC section
2.02(1), culpability was generally required “with respect to each material
element of the offense.”255 The court correctly concluded that age was a
material element of the offense, meaning that absolute liability was
inappropriate.256 The court then applied the offense definition’s stated
culpability level of knowledge even though it was prescribed in a separate
subsection.257 In doing so, the Blanton court ignored the language of
Oregon’s culpability provisions.258 Nowhere did the court acknowledge
that the statute distinguished the age requirement from other offense
elements, and the court never even considered the possibility of requiring
negligence.259

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(1) (West 2021). As I have written elsewhere, similar
language has created significant problems for states when it appears in default culpability
provisions. See England, supra note 54, at 61–66. Fortunately, the Blanton court limited
the effect of the “necessarily require[d]” limitation by suggesting that offense elements
require culpability whenever they “defin[e] the substance or quality of the forbidden
conduct.” 588 P.2d at 29–30.
251. See Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29.
252. See id. at 28 (quoting §167.207(1) (repealed 1977)).
253. Id. (quoting § 167.207(4) (repealed 1977)).
254. See id.
255. Id. at 29 (quoting § 161.095(2)).
256. See id. at 30.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 29–30.
259. See id. More recently, in State v. Jones, the Oregon Court of Appeals reached a
different conclusion about the culpability requirements for theft. 196 P.3d 97, 101–02 (Or.
Ct. App. 2008). The court held that the offense definition’s requirement of an intent to
deprive did not apply to a grading provision’s element of stealing property worth at least
$750. Id. at 102. The court reasoned, in part, that the statute grammatically distinguished
the element of value from the remaining offense elements. Id. (“Grammatically, the
culpable mental state—‘intent to deprive’—immediately precedes and directly modifies the
prohibited acts of taking, appropriating, obtaining, or withholding property from an
owner. . . . However, neither the grammatical structure nor the obvious legislative purpose
of the statute suggests that the culpable mental state extends to elements beyond the
prohibited act.”). The Jones court therefore imposed absolute liability as to the property’s
value without addressing the possibility of negligence under Oregon’s default culpability
provision. See id. at 101–02.
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Hawaii courts also struggle when an offense definition states a
culpability requirement, and a separate grading provision requires an
objective element without prescribing any mental state. Hawaii courts
have been especially confused about the culpability requirements for
theft.260 The problems originated in State v. Mitchell, decided by the
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals.261 A year later, in State v.
Cabrera, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the appellate court’s
interpretation,262 and subsequent courts have followed both cases.263 The
Mitchell court considered what culpability was required as to the value
of property obtained by theft.264 Hawaii defines theft to require an intent
to deprive the owner of property.265 In a separate statutory section, the
criminal code aggravates the offense based on the property’s value, but
without prescribing a new mental state.266 The MPC uses the same
approach.267
The Mitchell court held that Hawaii’s stated-culpability provision
required intent as to the value of stolen property.268 The court relied
heavily on the MPC’s commentary about theft’s grading provision, which
emphasizes the importance of requiring culpability as to value.269 Intent
is required, the court reasoned, because the commentary states that
stolen property’s value “has criminological significance only if it
corresponds with what the thief expected or hoped to get.”270 Inexplicably,
though, the court failed to address much more relevant MPC commentary
that appears just two pages earlier.271 That commentary explicitly states
that because “no culpability is explicitly stated” in theft’s grading
provision, “the consequence under Section 2.02(3) . . . is a minimum
culpability standard of recklessness.”272 Unsurprisingly, the Mitchell
court also failed to consider Hawaii’s version of section 2.02(3),273 which
260. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 965 P.2d 149 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Cabrera, 978
P.2d 797 (Haw. 1999); State v. Williams-Garcia, No. CAAP-17-0000604, 2020 WL 735041
(Haw. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2020); State v. Gaub, No. CAAP-15-0000547, 2017 WL 213513
(Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017).
261. Mitchell, 965 P.2d at 155–57.
262. Cabrera, 978 P.2d at 804–07.
263. See Williams-Garcia, 2020 WL 735041, at *3–4; Gaub, 2017 WL 213513, at *3–5.
264. See Mitchell, 965 P.2d at 155.
265. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-830(1) (West 2021).
266. Id. § 708-831(1)(b).
267. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(grading theft); id. § 223.2 (defining theft by unlawful taking or disposition).
268. Mitchell, 965 P.2d at 156.
269. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 223.1 cmt. 3 at 139, 146
(AM. L. INST. 1980)).
270. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 223.1 cmt. 3 at 146).
271. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART II § 223.1 cmt. 3 at 144.
272. Id. § 223.1 cmt. 3 at 144.
273. Mitchell, 965 P.2d at 155–56.

2022]

STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1247

also requires recklessness for elements that lack stated culpability
requirements.274 Likewise, the Hawaii Supreme Court also ignored the
state’s default culpability provision in Cabrera.275
In total, four states have applied stated culpability requirements too
broadly in offense definitions, grading provisions, or both.276 Courts
frustrate the MPC’s culpability scheme in applying stated-culpability
provisions so broadly, but at least they err on the side of construing
criminal statutes strictly. Much more commonly, state courts choose to
impose absolute liability even in the face of stated culpability
requirements. As will be discussed in the next two sections, courts often
ignore both stated and default culpability requirements in ways that
harm defendants by lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof.
C. Ignoring Stated Culpability Requirements Based on Legislative
Intent
Section 2.02(4)’s greatest defect is providing a legislative-intent
exception. As discussed earlier, the exception is unnecessary because
section 2.02(4) is limited to offenses that prescribe mental states without
distinguishing between offense elements.277 More problematically,
though, the exception can be interpreted to restrict the application of a
mental state when it precedes a series of consecutive elements.278 As
written, section 2.02(4) thus threatens to undermine the Code’s
culpability scheme by authorizing absolute liability, rather than
preventing it.
State courts in MPC jurisdictions commonly justify absolute liability
based on purported legislative intent.279 Courts often circumvent states’
versions of section 2.02(4) even when offenses prescribe mental states
without distinguishing between offense elements. The problem occurs
most clearly when a statute explicitly states a single culpability
requirement that is followed by consecutive objective elements. In that
situation, section 2.02(4) is designed to resolve any ambiguity about
whether the prescribed mental state applies to each element in the series
or just the first one that it precedes.280 The ordinary rule, again, is that

274. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN § 702-204 (West 2021).
275. See State v. Cabrera, 978 P.2d 797, 804–07 (Haw. 1999).
276. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2 (discussing state court applications of culpability
requirements in Arkansas, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Oregon).
277. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Section II.C.
279. See England, supra note 54, at 70–74 (discussing absolute liability for offenses that
fail to prescribe culpability requirements).
280. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., Part I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245 (A M. L. INST. 1985).
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the prescribed culpability level applies to each objective element. 281
Nevertheless, state courts often limit the scope of stated culpability
requirements that immediately precede consecutive offense elements.
1.

Series of Consecutive Offense Elements

Under section 2.02(4), a stated culpability level should almost always
apply to each requirement in a series of consecutive, uninterrupted
elements.282 The culpability requirement applies to the entire series
because it fails to distinguish between particular elements.283 Moreover,
section 2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception does not apply because no
“contrary purpose plainly appears” when a statute states a culpability
requirement followed by a series of uninterrupted elements.284
Significantly, the MPC’s commentary makes clear that section 2.02(4)
applies to all the objective elements that immediately follow a stated
culpability level.285 Under the Code’s approach, then, a legislature need
not repeat the culpability requirement for each new element in the series.
But many state courts refuse to apply a prescribed mental state to
each requirement in a series of consecutive, uninterrupted elements.
State courts often use weak evidence of legislative intent to evade stated
culpability requirements. First, some courts erroneously infer that a
legislature intends to impose absolute liability if it fails to individually
prescribe a culpability requirement for each objective element.286 For
example, in State v. Denby, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to
apply a stated culpability requirement to an offense that criminalizes
possessing a controlled substance with intent to sell it within one
thousand feet of a school.287 Significantly, the statute prescribed a
culpability level of intent, followed by consecutive, uninterrupted
elements that included the proximity requirement. 288 Therefore, the
Connecticut Supreme Court should have required that the defendant
possessed a controlled substance with the intent to sell it within one
thousand feet of a school. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
statute did not require any culpability as to the requirement of
proximity.289 Instead, the court asserted that the statute’s plain language
required “that the defendant intended to sell or dispense those drugs in

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682, 684–85 (Conn. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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his or her possession at a specific location, which location happens to be
within 1000 feet of an elementary or secondary school.”290 Strangely, the
court reasoned that the offense fails to require knowledge as to proximity
even though the defendant argued that the statute requires intent for
that element.291 If the legislature had intended to require knowledge, the
court continued, it could have done so by explicitly requiring that the
defendant know that he was within one thousand feet of a school.292
Later, in State v. Vasquez, the Connecticut Appellate Court followed
Denby, holding that an amended version of the statute also did not
require intent for the proximity requirement.293 Under a proper
application of Connecticut’s version of section 2.02(4), both courts should
have required intent as to proximity.294
The Kansas Court of Appeals similarly inferred that the legislature
intended to impose absolute liability because a statute failed to repeat a
culpability requirement.295 In State v. Gillon, the defendant was
convicted for possessing a sawed-off shotgun.296 According to the court,
the offense criminalized “knowingly . . . possessing or carrying a shotgun
with a barrel less than 18 inches in length.”297 Under Kansas’s statedculpability provision, the offense requires knowledge as to the length of
a shotgun’s barrel because the statute prescribes the mental state of
knowledge without distinguishing between offense elements.298 But the
Gillon court ignored the stated-culpability provision, instead concluding
that the word “knowingly” modified only the phrase “possessing or
carrying.”299 The requirement did not apply to the length requirement,
the court asserted, because that was “an adjective modifier, modifying
the noun ‘shotgun.’”300 Finally, the court reasoned that the legislature
could have easily required knowledge by requiring that the “possessor or
carrier know” that a gun’s barrel was under eighteen inches long.301 Of
course, such language is completely unnecessary under stated-culpability
provisions influenced by section 2.02(4).302 An offense must make clear
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. Id. at 685.
293. State v. Vasquez, 783 A.2d 1183, 1190–91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
294. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (“When one and only one of such terms appears
in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense
unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”).
295. See State v. Gillon, 974 P.2d 1115, 1116 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
296. Id. at 1115.
297. Id. at 1116 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4201(a)(7) (West 1996) (repealed 2011)).
298. See § 21-5202(f).
299. Gillon, 974 P.2d at 1116.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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that a culpability requirement does not apply to an element, rather than
that it does.
Second, some courts limit stated culpability requirements by broadly
characterizing offenses’ purposes. In Illinois, for example, People v. Ivy
has been particularly influential in interpreting offenses’ culpability
requirements.303 In that case, the defendant was convicted for the offense
of unlawful use of a weapon.304 Much like the statute at issue in Gillon,
the offense occurs when one “knowingly . . . [s]ells, manufactures,
purchases, possesses, or carries . . . a shotgun having one or more barrels
less than 18 inches in length.”305 The defendant was convicted for
threatening another person with a duffel bag that contained a sawed-off
shotgun.306 The defendant presented evidence that the gun and bag
belonged to her boyfriend, and she neither opened the bag nor knew the
gun was a sawed-off shotgun.307 The Illinois Appellate Court, however,
held that the defendant only needed to know that she possessed a gun;
she did not need to know that it was a sawed-off shotgun.308 The court
reasoned, in part, that sawed-off shotguns “are so inherently dangerous
to human life that they constitute a hazard to society.”309 Hence, the court
concluded that the legislature did not intend to require that the
defendant be aware of the gun’s characteristics.310 The court failed to
address Illinois’s stated-culpability provision,311 which is nearly identical
to section 2.02(4).312
In People v. Jones, the Illinois Appellate Court used similar reasoning
to limit the culpability required for the offense of criminal damage to
property.313 The offense occurs when one “knowingly damages any
property of another.”314 In Jones, the alleged offense occurred when the

303. People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
304. Id. at 401.
305. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii) (West 2021).
306. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d at 401–02.
307. Id. at 402.
308. Id. at 403–04.
309. Id. at 403.
310. Id. at 403–04.
311. See id.
312. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2012) (“If the statute defining
an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole,
without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to
each such element.”), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (“When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is
sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material
elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense
. . . .”).
313. People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
314. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-1(a)(1).
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defendant totaled his estranged wife’s car by driving into it.315 The
defendant testified that he was a co-owner of the car because he and his
wife bought it together.316 Although the offense requires knowingly
damaging the property of another, the court held that “‘knowingly’
modifies the next word, ‘damages,’ but not ‘property of another.’”317 The
court ignored Illinois’s version of section 2.02(4).318 Instead, relying on
Ivy,319 the court vaguely concluded, without further explanation, that its
interpretation was required by “[l]egislative intent and the construction
of the statute.”320
Finally, state courts sometimes ignore governing stated-culpability
provisions while following nonbinding authorities from other
jurisdictions. In Robertson v. State, for instance, the Delaware Supreme
Court reviewed a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine.321 At
the time, the offense occurred when a defendant was “knowingly in actual
or constructive possession of five grams or more of cocaine.”322 In its
analysis of the offense’s culpability requirements, the court failed to even
address Delaware’s stated-culpability provision,323 which applies
whenever a statute prescribes a mental state without distinguishing
between offense elements.324 Rather, the court relied on a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, which interpreted the word “knowingly” in a
similar statute to “modif[y] only the possession element of the offense and
not the quantity.”325 Thus, following a court not even governed by a
provision like section 2.02(4), the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that the legislature did not intend to require culpability for the element
of weight.326
In Ex parte Washington, the Alabama Supreme Court also ignored a
binding stated-culpability provision to affirm a conviction for trafficking

315. See Jones, 495 N.E.2d at 1372.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 1373.
318. See id. at 1372–73.
319. People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399, 403–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
320. Jones, 495 N.E.2d at 1373.
321. Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Del. 1991).
322. Id. at 1354 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4753A (West 1991) (repealed 2011)).
323. See id. at 1355.
324. tit. 11, § 252.
325. Robertson, 596 A.2d at 1355 (quoting Way v. State, 475 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1985)).
326. Id. A year before the court’s decision in Robertson, the Delaware legislature
amended the statute to clarify that the prosecution did not need to prove that a defendant
knew the weight of a controlled substance. See id. at 1355 n.6. The amendment did not
apply to the defendant in Robertson because he was arrested before the statute became
effective. Id. Therefore, the court could have easily concluded that knowledge was required
at the time of the defendant’s arrest. More importantly, though, the statute originally
required knowledge as to the element of weight. Id.
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in cocaine.327 The Alabama trafficking statute applies when one “is
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of[] 28 grams or more of
cocaine.”328 As the dissent noted, because the weight element appears
before the reference to cocaine, the statute “is at least as positive in
applying the mental state of knowledge to the quantity of cocaine as the
text is in applying that same mental state to the identity of the
cocaine.”329 Yet the court held that the defendant did not need to know
the weight of the drugs he possessed.330 The court relied on multiple cases
from states that have not adopted the MPC, including Georgia,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina.331 The court also discussed the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Robertson,332 which itself relied on
a decision from the non-MPC state of Florida.333
In sum, then, courts in at least five states refuse to apply a stated
culpability level to each requirement in a series of consecutive elements.
In all five states—Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, and
Kansas—offenses themselves must make clear that stated-culpability
provisions do not apply to particular offense elements.334 But courts
routinely overlook that requirement because they also completely ignore
their states’ versions of section 2.02(4). Many courts seem to be looking
for ways to justify absolute liability rather than ways to prevent it.
2.

Consecutive Offense Elements That Are Arguably Interrupted

Additionally, in some states, courts have imposed absolute liability
when a word or phrase introduces an offense element in a way that
suggests that a stated culpability requirement might not apply. As
discussed earlier, the MPC’s commentary does not offer much help in
interpreting consecutive offense elements that are arguably

327. See Ex parte Washington, 818 So. 2d 424, 425–27 (Ala. 2001).
328. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2) (2021).
329. Washington, 818 So. 2d at 427 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (majority opinion).
331. Id. at 426–27.
332. Id. at 426. In Washington, the court failed to address the New York Court of
Appeals’ decision in People v. Ryan. See id. at 426–27. In Ryan, the court correctly held that
New York’s stated-culpability provision required the defendant to know the weight of the
controlled substance he was charged with possessing. People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51, 54
(N.Y. 1993) (“Inasmuch as the knowledge requirement carries through to the end of the
sentence, eliminating it from the intervening element—weight—would rob the statute of
its obvious meaning. We conclude, therefore, that there is a mens rea element associated
with the weight of the drug.”) (citation omitted).
333. Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991).
334. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(a) (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2021);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 252 (West 2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2021);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(f) (West 2021).
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interrupted.335 But section 2.02(4) generally requires a stated culpability
requirement to apply to all offense elements “unless a contrary purpose
plainly appears.”336 If a minor word or phrase only arguably
distinguishes an element, it follows that the offense is unclear about
whether the prescribed culpability level applies. Importantly, section
2.02(4) is designed to resolve precisely that kind of ambiguity.337
Therefore, minor interrupting language can never plainly evince a
purpose to restrict a culpability level that applies to a series of
consecutive elements. If a legislature intends a different result, the
statute needs to say so explicitly.
Courts have interpreted minor interrupting language differently in
at least New Jersey and Colorado.338 For example, in State v. Smith, the
New Jersey Supreme Court imposed absolute liability for a statute that
criminalizes possessing a defaced firearm.339 The statute provides that a
person commits the offense if he “knowingly has in his possession any
firearm which has been defaced, except an antique firearm or an antique
handgun.”340 The court stated that the phrase “which has been defaced”
appears “in an attenuated position from the word ‘knowingly.’”341 If the
legislature wanted to require knowledge of defacement, the court
reasoned, it could have prohibited knowingly possessing “a defaced
firearm.”342 Nevertheless, the court assumed that the statute was
ambiguous about the culpability required for defacement.343 In resolving
the ambiguity, the court failed to even consult New Jersey’s statedculpability provision.344 That provision, like section 2.02(4), generally
resolves such an ambiguity by applying the stated culpability level.345
335. See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
336. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
337. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 6 at 245 (A M. L. INST. 1985).
338. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281, 289 (N.J. 2009); People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d
728, 735 (Colo. App. 2011), overruled on other grounds by People v. Hasadinratana, 493
P.3d 925, 926 (Colo. App. May 13, 2021).
339. Smith, 963 A.2d at 289.
340. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(d) (West 2021).
341. Smith, 963 A.2d at 285. In State v. Gandhi, the New Jersey Supreme Court used a
similar approach in interpreting the culpability requirements for the offense of stalking.
See State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256, 266 (N.J. 2010) (“Here, the proximity of ‘purposefully’
and ‘knowingly’ to the verb ‘engages’ emphasizes the relationship of those adverbs to that
verb. In contrast, the clause emphasized by defendant . . . is remote from the key modifying
adverbs.”).
342. Smith, 963 A.2d at 286.
343. Id.
344. See id. at 286–89.
345. See § 2C:2-2(c)(1). In People v. Velasquez, the New York Supreme Court held that a
statute with similar language required knowledge of defacement. People v. Velasquez, 528
N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). That statute, like New Jersey’s, criminalizes
knowingly possessing a firearm “which has been defaced.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(3)
(McKinney 2021).
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Similarly, in People v. DeWitt, the Colorado Court of Appeals relied
on a statute’s use of minor interrupting language to disregard a stated
culpability requirement.346 The defendant in that case was convicted for
the offense of possessing a weapon by a prior offender.347 Under the
statute, a person commits the offense if he or she “knowingly possesses,
uses, or carries upon his or her person a firearm . . . subsequent to the
person’s conviction for a felony.”348 The DeWitt court held that the statute
did not require the defendant to know that he had been convicted of a
felony.349 The court declined to apply the state’s version of section 2.02(4),
in part, because the phrase “subsequent to” distinguished the priorconviction requirement from other offense elements. 350 That language
would seem, at most, to render the statute ambiguous about whether a
defendant must know of a prior conviction. Nevertheless, the court
asserted that requiring knowledge would undermine the statute, whose
purpose “is to limit the possession of firearms” by ex-felons.351 Thus, the
court refused to apply the rule of lenity because the offense’s plain
language did not require knowledge of a prior conviction.352
In employing such reasoning, courts limit stated-culpability
provisions in ways that are fundamentally inconsistent with the MPC’s
vision for criminal liability. Stated-culpability provisions help enforce the
Code’s norm of requiring culpability for each objective element of an
offense.353 Never is a provision like section 2.02(4) implicated more
clearly than when an offense prescribes a mental state that is
immediately followed by consecutive objective elements. Even when
minor language arguably distinguishes some requirements from others,
section 2.02(4) resolves any ambiguity by applying the stated culpability
level to each element in the series.354 Vague considerations of legislative
intent should never overcome section 2.02(4)’s rule of construction, but
they have in many MPC states.355
346. See People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728, 735 (Colo. App. 2011), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Hasadinratana, 493 P.3d 925 (Colo. App. 2021).
347. Id. at 730.
348. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-108(1) (West 2021).
349. DeWitt, 275 P.3d at 735.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 735–36.
352. Id.
353. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
354. See id. § 2.02(4).
355. See, e.g., Ex parte Washington, 818 So. 2d 424, 425–27 (Ala. 2001); People v. DeWitt,
275 P.3d 728, 735 (Colo. App. 2011), overruled on other grounds by People v. Hasadinratana,
493 P.3d 925, 926 (Colo. App. May 13, 2021); State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682, 684–85 (Conn.
1995); State v. Vasquez, 783 A.2d 1183, 1190–91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Robertson v. State,
596 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Del. 1991); People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399, 403–04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Gillon, 974 P.2d
1115, 1116 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281, 289 (N.J. 2009).
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D. Imposing Absolute Liability by Ignoring Default Culpability
Provisions
In summary, courts have made significant mistakes in applying
stated culpability requirements in most of the twenty-five states with
culpability provisions influenced by the MPC. Mistakes occur just as
often in states with stated-culpability provisions as in states without
them, and courts usually err in ways that benefit prosecutors rather than
defendants.
The MPC’s drafters took strong measures to prevent legislatures and
courts from imposing absolute liability. Section 2.02(1) generally requires
culpability for each element of the offense, and section 2.02(4) helps
enforce that requirement by resolving ambiguities about the scope of
prescribed mental states.356 As discussed earlier, section 2.02(3) further
protects against absolute liability by requiring a default culpability level
of recklessness for any objective elements not covered by section
2.02(4).357 Moreover, section 2.05 permits absolute liability only for an
extremely narrow class of offenses.358
Hence, when determining the culpability required for a given
element, a court should normally choose between any prescribed mental
state and the default culpability level of recklessness. As discussed
earlier, some courts apply stated-culpability provisions too broadly
because they perceive their choices as being between stated culpability
levels and absolute liability.359 Hence, in Arkansas, Hawaii, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania, courts have applied stated culpability levels to offense
elements even though they are grammatically distinguished from other
requirements.360 In all four states, courts have overlooked state criminal
codes’ versions of section 2.02(3) when determining offenses’ culpability
requirements.361
Much more commonly, courts choose to impose absolute liability
rather than to apply stated culpability requirements. In some states, that
may occur in part because criminal codes fail to explicitly require
culpability for each offense element.362 Additionally, in many

356. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1), (4).
357. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Section III.B.
360. See supra Section III.B.
361. See supra Section III.B.
362. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.610 (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181-503 (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-22 (West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.102-02 (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 6.02 (West 2021).
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jurisdictions, courts legitimately face choices between stated culpability
levels and absolute liability because criminal codes lack true default
culpability provisions. Some MPC states never enacted rules like section
2.02(3),363 and others apply default culpability requirements only when
offenses fail to require any culpability at all.364 Thus, when interpreting
culpability requirements, many courts do not have the option of requiring
default culpability levels.
But many MPC states do explicitly require culpability for each
offense element,365 and many have default culpability provisions that
follow section 2.02(3) more closely.366 Nevertheless, courts in such
jurisdictions rarely consider default culpability rules when applying
stated culpability requirements. In fact, my survey identified only one
case in which a court addressed a state’s default culpability requirement
while refusing to apply a prescribed culpability level.367 That is odd.
After all, default culpability provisions are designed to provide an
extra line of defense against absolute liability. Section 2.02(4) applies
when a statute “prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of an offense,”368 and section 2.02(3) applies when the
required culpability “is not prescribed by law.”369 Hence, if a court
concludes that a prescribed culpability level does not apply to an element,
the court should always consult the criminal code’s default culpability
provision if one exists.
Courts in MPC states never do that, and that failure often creates
harsh results. For example, as discussed earlier, the defendant in People
363. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34 (2021).
364. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(g) (West
2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(2) (West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (West 2021).
365. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(b) (West 2021); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204 (West 2021); 720 ILL . COMP. STAT. A NN. 5/4-3(a) (West 2021);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (West 2021); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I) (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (West 2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 15.15(2) (McKinney 2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.095(2) (West 2021); 18 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(a) (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(a)(1) (West
2021).
366. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.610(b); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-203(b); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-503(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b) (West
2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 501.040; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-0202(2) (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C)(1); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.115(2);
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(c).
367. See Ortberg v. State, 751 P.2d 1368, 1374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the
state’s argument that recklessness was required).
368. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
369. Id. § 2.02(3).
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v. Ivy was convicted for the offense of unlawful use of a weapon.370 The
defendant threatened the victim with a duffel bag that turned out to
contain a sawed-off shotgun, and the defendant presented evidence that
she did not know the gun’s character.371 The offense at issue applies to
one who “knowingly . . . possesses or carries . . . a shotgun having one or
more barrels less than 18 inches in length.”372 By its terms, the offense
definition requires knowledge as to a shotgun’s length. Nevertheless, the
Illinois Appellate Court held that knowledge was not required because
the legislature likely did not intend that result.373 The court failed to
address Illinois’s default culpability provision,374 which requires
recklessness “[i]f the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state
applicable to an element of an offense.”375 Hence, at a minimum, the Ivy
court should have required recklessness as to the shotgun’s length. That
would demand that the defendant “consciously disregard[] a substantial
and unjustifiable risk” that the weapon was a sawed-off shotgun.376
On its own, ignoring a prescribed culpability requirement is
extremely problematic. But courts exacerbate that mistake when they
also refuse to require any culpability at all. In imposing absolute liability
in the face of stated culpability requirements, courts thus evade both
section 2.02(3) and section 2.02(4) in ways that undermine the Code’s
culpability scheme.
IV. PROPOSED STATED-CULPABILITY RULES
This Part recommends new rules that better effectuate the Code’s
norm of requiring culpability for each offense element. The proposed
stated-culpability provision, like section 2.02(4), is designed to resolve
ambiguity that is created when a single culpability requirement precedes
a series of objective elements.
The proposed provision makes significant changes to section 2.02(4)
so that it can perform its main function more effectively. The revisions
are designed to address section 2.02(4)’s shortcomings, prevent the
problems experienced in MPC states, and better enforce section 2.02(1)’s
requirement of culpability for each offense element. The following
provisions would replace sections 2.02(1) and 2.02(4):

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
See id. at 400–02.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii) (West 2021).
Ivy, 479 N.E.2d at 403–04.
See id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b).
Id. 5/4-6.
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(1) To be guilty of an offense, a person must have some level of
culpability, as defined in [cross-reference to culpability
definitions], as to every objective element of the offense,
except as provided in subsection (4).
(2) When a statute prescribes a culpability requirement without
distinguishing between consecutive objective elements, the
culpability requirement applies to each such element.
Subsection (1) is similar to section 2.02(1) in generally requiring
culpability for each offense element.377 Subsection (2) helps enforce that
requirement by resolving any ambiguity about how a stated culpability
requirement applies to a series of objective elements. The proposed rule
follows the Code by applying the prescribed culpability level to each such
element, but it makes three significant changes to section 2.02(4).378
First, the proposed stated-culpability provision applies to “a statute”
rather than “the law defining an offense.”379 As discussed earlier, section
2.02(4) appears to exclude culpability requirements that might apply to
grading provisions.380 Moreover, state courts often refuse on principle to
apply stated culpability requirements to offense elements that appear in
grading provisions.381 In fact, some courts go so far as to distinguish
offense definitions for aggravated offenses from ordinary offense
definitions.382
Despite section 2.02(4)’s language, the MPC’s drafters never
intended to exclude elements that appear in grading provisions, much
less exclude elements required for aggravated offenses.383 Such
distinctions are largely fortuitous, as a criminal code may use either an
offense definition or a grading provision to require a given element. For
example, a criminal code could treat assault and aggravated assault as
distinct offenses with separate offense definitions and grading
provisions. Alternatively, a criminal code could include just an assault
offense, using one subsection to define the basic offense and others to
enhance the penalty when aggravating circumstances are present. It is
arbitrary to enforce a stated culpability requirement for the first drafting
approach but not the second.

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
1985).

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Id. § 2.02(4).
See id.
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra notes 175–95 and accompanying text.
See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTS., PART I § 2.02 cmt. 1 at 229–32 (AM. L. INST.
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The proposed stated-culpability provision applies to any statute, thus
eliminating any possible distinction between offense definitions and
grading provisions. Importantly, proposed subsections (1) and (2) both
require culpability for objective elements. To make it even clearer that
both provisions apply to grading provisions, “objective elements” should
be defined as follows:
“Objective elements” include such conduct, such attendant
circumstances, and such a result of conduct as are contained in
the definition of an offense, in a provision establishing an offense
grade, or in a provision specifying the severity of the punishment
for an offense. Objective elements do not include culpability
requirements.384
Hence, subsection (2) enforces stated culpability requirements
regardless of where they appear. Similarly, subsection (1) requires
culpability for offense definitions and grading provisions alike.
Second, the proposed stated-culpability provision differs from section
2.02(4) because it applies only to consecutive offense elements.385 When
an offense prescribes a mental state without distinguishing between
elements, section 2.02(4) broadly applies the stated culpability
requirement to “all the material elements of the offense.”386 In doing so,
the MPC risks bringing section 2.02(4) into conflict with the Code’s
default culpability provision, section 2.02(3).387 The Code particularly
struggles when an offense states a culpability requirement in one part of
a sentence, and another part requires an objective element without
prescribing a new mental state.388 Similarly, in at least four states with
provisions influenced by section 2.02(4), courts have applied stated
culpability requirements to offense elements even though they are
grammatically distinguished from other offense requirements.389
The proposed stated-culpability provision limits its application
according to its purpose. Like section 2.02(4), the proposed provision is
intended to resolve any ambiguity that may arise when a culpability

384. This culpability provision is based on one proposed by the Illinois Criminal Code
Rewrite and Reform Commission. Paul Robinson was the Commission’s Reporter and
principal drafter, Michael Cahill served as Staff Director, and I served as a staff attorney.
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION 11 (2003).
385. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
386. Id.
387. See supra notes 119–39 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 107–18 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Section III.B.
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requirement precedes a series of offense elements.390 Hence, proposed
subsection (2) applies “[w]hen a statute prescribes a culpability
requirement without distinguishing between consecutive objective
elements.” In such a situation, the stated culpability level applies “to each
such element,” rather than just the first one in the series. For example,
if an offense criminalized knowingly causing bodily harm to a person
sixty-five or older, the proposed provision would require that the
defendant both knowingly cause bodily harm and know the victim’s
age.391
A stated culpability requirement should not apply, however, to
offense elements that are distinguished grammatically by punctuation,
syntax, or both. Hence, the proposed provision does not apply if an offense
definition states a culpability requirement in one clause, and another
clause requires an offense element without prescribing a mental state.
Nor does the provision apply when a separate grading provision requires
a new element without specifying a culpability level. Rather, in both
situations, courts should apply the default culpability level of
recklessness. Importantly, proposed subsection (2) applies the stated
culpability requirement only to the clause at issue rather than to every
element of the offense.392 As a result, the proposed provision avoids the
problems that occur when a court applies a stated culpability
requirement to every offense element, including those that are
distinguished grammatically.
Third, and most importantly, the proposed provision eliminates
section 2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception. The current exception is
redundant at best, given that section 2.02(4) applies only when a statute
prescribes a mental state without distinguishing between offense
elements.393 At worst, the exception appears to limit the application of a
mental state that precedes a series of consecutive objective elements. 394
390. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
391. Cf. People v. Burman, 102 N.Y.S.3d 850, 852–53 (App. Div. 2019) (refusing to
require culpability to the offense definition that required intent as to the victim’s age).
392. Similarly, Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill have proposed that a prescribed
mental state “apply to the grammatical clause in which it appears unless the context
demonstrates that it is intended to apply to other, subsequent clauses.” PAUL H. ROBINSON
& MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2.5, at 179 (2d ed. 2012). Under that approach, a
culpability requirement ordinarily applies only to the grammatical clause in which it
appears, and section 2.02(3) requires recklessness for other elements. Id. at 176–79. My
proposal omits such a limitation because I do not think that section 2.02(4)’s breadth is its
main flaw. Some courts have applied the provision too broadly, but it is far more common
for courts to avoid section 2.02(4) entirely. For that reason, my proposed provision errs on
the side of applying stated culpability requirements instead of default culpability
requirements. I agree that recklessness should be required, however, if a statute prescribes
a culpability requirement in a way that distinguishes some offense elements from others.
393. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Section II.C.

2022]

STATED CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1261

In real-world cases, courts in MPC jurisdictions have relied on vague
considerations of legislative intent both to evade stated culpability
requirements and to justify the imposition of absolute liability.395 Despite
section 2.02(4), courts often refuse to apply a stated culpability
requirement even when it immediately precedes a series of consecutive
objective elements.396 Stated-culpability provisions are designed to
resolve that precise kind of ambiguity.
As shown by the case law in MPC states, legislative-intent exceptions
are highly vulnerable to judicial manipulation.397 Moreover, courts do not
seem to be constrained by the exception’s requirement of a plain purpose
to limit the scope of a prescribed mental state.398 The best solution is to
simply eliminate the exception. If a statute prescribes a mental state for
a series of objective elements, the legislature should not be surprised if a
court requires that culpability level for each element in the series. After
all, courts are traditionally required to construe criminal statutes strictly
in favor of defendants.399 If a different result is intended, a separate
provision can clarify that the stated culpability requirement does not
apply to every element in the series.
By eliminating section 2.02(4)’s legislative-intent exception, the
proposed provision clarifies the role of stated culpability requirements in
the MPC’s culpability scheme. Importantly, the provision is designed to
prevent absolute liability rather than to authorize it. The statedculpability provision works in conjunction with the following proposed
default culpability provision:
(3) When no culpability requirement is prescribed with regard
to an objective element, a requirement of recklessness is
applicable, except as provided in subsection (4).400
Significantly, the stated-culpability provision appears before the
default culpability provision.401 By reversing the order of the two
provisions, the proposed culpability section clarifies how the two
provisions work together to require culpability for each offense element.
A court should first identify an offense’s stated culpability requirements,
395. See supra Section III.C.
396. See supra Section III.C.
397. See supra Section III.C.
398. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(providing an exception when “a contrary purpose plainly appears”).
399. See 3 SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 59:3 (8th ed. 2021).
400. This provision is nearly identical to one I recently proposed in another article. See
England, supra note 54, at 84–86.
401. See id.
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using subsection (2) to resolve any ambiguities about their proper scope.
If a statute does not prescribe a culpability requirement for an element,
subsection (3) provides an extra line of defense by imposing the default
culpability level of recklessness. As a practical matter, then, a court
should normally choose between any prescribed mental state and the
default level of recklessness when determining the culpability required
for an offense element. Thus, recklessness should be required if a statute
indicates grammatically that a culpability requirement applies to some
objective elements but not others.
Finally, absolute liability is appropriate only under proposed
subsection (4). This final proposed provision limits the circumstances
under which absolute liability may be imposed:
(4) When no culpability requirement is prescribed with regard
to an objective element, no culpability is required as to that
element if
(a) the offense is a violation; or
(b) the statute defining the offense or other statutory
provision
(i)
imposes absolute liability for that element by
using the phrase “in fact,”
(ii)
explicitly states that the offense imposes
“absolute liability” or “strict liability” as to that
element, or
(iii)
otherwise explicitly states a person may commit
the offense without having any level of
culpability as to that element.
Subsection (4) makes significant changes to the MPC’s absoluteliability provision, section 2.05.402 Most importantly, subsection (4)
generally prohibits absolute liability in the absence of an explicit
statement that no culpability is required. Hence, courts thus may not rely
on vague evidence of legislative intent to evade both stated and default
culpability requirements, as they often do under current law. Instead, a
statute must explicitly impose absolute liability by using phrases like
“absolute liability,” “strict liability,” and “in fact.” With such a
requirement, it would be much more challenging for courts to completely
ignore criminal codes’ culpability provisions.
In sum, the proposed culpability rules better effectuate the Code’s
requirement of culpability for each offense element. The proposed statedculpability provision applies to offense definitions and grading provisions

402.

See id. at 86–88.
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alike, and absolute liability cannot be imposed in the absence of an
explicit statutory statement.
CONCLUSION
For more than half a century, the MPC has been a prevailing force in
American criminal law. The MPC’s most lasting contribution is its
approach to culpability requirements, which has influenced criminal
codes in twenty-five states.403 In requiring culpability for each offense
element, the Code’s drafters took strong measures to prevent the
imposition of absolute liability.404 The MPC’s stated-culpability
provision, section 2.02(4), plays a central role in the Code’s celebrated
culpability scheme by clarifying that a prescribed mental state generally
applies to each element.405 Section 2.02(4) has been particularly
influential in MPC jurisdictions, with nineteen states including similar
provisions in their criminal codes.406
Section 2.02(4) has been largely ineffective, however, in enforcing
stated culpability requirements and preventing the imposition of
absolute liability. In fact, courts with stated-culpability provisions
impose absolute liability just as often as states without them.407 The
biggest problem is the provision itself. Section 2.02(4) is unclear about
when and how it applies, and state courts thus have circumvented the
provision time after time.408
This Article has recommended new rules that clarify the role of
prescribed mental states in the Code’s culpability scheme. The proposed
provisions also improve the MPC by enforcing culpability requirements
stated in grading provisions, eliminating section 2.02(4)’s flawed
legislative-intent exception, and limiting the imposition of absolute
liability.409 The proposed provisions better enforce the Code’s norm of
requiring culpability for each element. In doing so, the proposals better
ensure that criminal liability and punishment always correspond to a
defendant’s blameworthiness, bringing criminal codes closer to the
drafters’ vision for American criminal law.

403. Id. at 48, 81–83.
404. Id. at 54 (stating that “[t]he Code’s drafters addressed their aversion to absolute
liability most clearly in the commentary for section 2.05”).
405. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
406. See statutes cited supra note 160.
407. See supra Section III.
408. See supra Section III.
409. See generally supra Section IV.

